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SANTRAUKA 
Tautinis identitetas yra esminis faktorius atliekantis ypatingai svarbų vaidmenį tarptautinėje politikoje. 
Būtent tautinis identitetas suformuoja šalį kaip unikalią veikėją tarptautiniuose santykiuose, todėl 
analizuojant šalies tautinį identitetą galima paaiškinti tos šalies elgesį, taip pat ir numatyti būsimus 
veiksmus. Šis baigiamasis magistro darbas siekia išanalizuoti abipusį Lietuvos tautinio identiteto poveikį 
Lietuvos bei Europos Sąjungos santykiuose. Tam, kad pasiekti tikslą, iškelti pagrindiniai uždaviniai: 
ištirti Lietuvos tautinio identiteto raidą, identifikuoti kultūrinius bei istorinius faktorius suformafusius 
Lietuvos tautinį identitetą, išnagrinėti Lietuvos užsienio politiką bei išsiaiškinti kokia Lietuvos tautinio 
identiteto įtaka Lietuvos bei Europos Sąjungos santykiams.  
Šis magistro baigiamasis darbas susideda iš trijų, pagrindinių dalių. Pirmasis skyrius skirtas 
pagrindinių sąvokų bei teorijų analizavimui. Apibrėžiamos sąvokos, tokios kaip tauta, tautiškumas, 
identitetas ir galiausiai tautinis identitetas, aptariamas ryšys tarp tautinio identiteto ir tarpautinių 
santykių, identifikuojant pagrindines teorijas, tokias kaip konstruktyvizmas ir tarptautinių santykių 
teorija. Taip pat, šiame skyriuje apibrėžiama Europietiškojo tapatumo sąvoka. Antrasis šio baigiamojo 
magistro darbo skyrius skirtas apžvelgti identiteto srityje įvykdytus tyrimus tokius kaip Richard Lewis 
ir Geert Hofstede sukurti modeliai bei Ronald Inglehart pasauliniai vertybių tyrimai. Trečiasis skyrius 
analizuoja Lietuvos tautinį identietą ir jo įtaką Lietuvos bei Europos Sąjungos santykiams. Visų pirma, 
šiame skyriuje atliekant antrinių duomenų analizę, identifikuojami kultūriniai bei istoriniai faktoriai 
atsakingi už suformuotą Lietuvos tautinį idenitetą ir Lietuvos veiksmus tarptautiniuose santykiuose. 
Toliau, siekiant išsiaiškinti kokia Europos Sąjungos narė yra Lietuva ir koks Lietuvos požiūris į Europos 
Sąjungą, šiame skyriuje analizuojami Europos Komisijos dokumentai bei atliktos apklausos 
Eurobarometer įvykdytos skirtingais metais tam, kad aptikti pokyčius Lietuvos požiūryje ir vertybėse. 
Atlikta lyginamoji analizė tam, kad palyginti Lietuvos bei Europos Sąjungos vertybes ir išsiaiškinti ar 
Lietuvos ir Europinis identitetai konfliktuoja tarpusavyje. Galiausiai, šis skyrius taip pat nagrinėja kaip 
Lietuvos tautinis identitetas pasireiškia Lietuvos užsienio politikoje.    
Šiame baigiamajame magistro darbe išsiaiškinta, kad Lietuvos tautiniame identitete atsispindi 
traumuojantys istoriniai įvykiai bei Sovietų Sąjungos įteigtos, bei kovojant už nepriklausomybę ir kalbos 
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laisvę įgytos vertybės. Tautinis identitetas ne tik formuoja Lietuvą kaip unikalią Europos Sąjungos narę, 
bet ir tiesiogiai įtakoja Lietuvos užsienio politiką. Unikalus Lietuvos tautinis identitetas formuoja 
Lietuvą kaip optimistiškiausią, labiausiai Europos Sąjungai pritariančią, šalis patyrusias panašius 
istorinius išgyvenimus užjaučiančią bei dažnai per stipriai savo tautinį identitetą ginančią šalį. Nepaisant 
to, kad Lietuva dėl savo post-sovietinio identiteto vis dar gali būti matoma kaip nepilnavertė Europos 
Sąjungos narė, Lietuva yra pereinamajame laikotarpyje: jaunoji karta su moderniomis vertybėmis 
pamažu keičia senąją, suvaržytą bei skaudžių prisiminimų apie Sovietų Sąjungą pripildytą kartą, todėl į 
Lietuvos ateitį galima žvelgti optimistiškai - šie pokyčiai galiausiai leis Lietuvai pasijausti pilnaverte 
Europos Sąjungos nare. 
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SUMMARY 
 
National identity is a substantial element which plays a significantly important role in international 
politics. National identity shapes the country as a unique player in international relations, therefore, 
analysis of the national identity of a specific country allows to explain the behavior as well as to foresee 
the future actions of that country. The aim of the research is to analyse the mutual impact that Lithuanian 
national identity has on relations with the European Union. In order to achieve this aim, the following 
tasks have been set: to investigate the evolution of Lithuania’s national identity; to analyze Lithuanian 
national identity from cultural and historical perspectives; to consider how Lithuanian national identity 
is reflected in Lithuanian - EU relations; to perform an analysis of Lithuanian foreign policy and to 
investigate the impact of Lithuania’s EU membership on its own national identity.  
This thesis consists of three main chapters. The first chapter is dedicated to defining terminology 
and main theories related to the topic. In this chapter the concepts of nation, nationalism as well as 
identity and national identity are discussed. Further on, this chapter discusses the relation of national 
identity with international relations by identifying theories such as constructivism and International 
Relations theory. What is more, this chapter also explains the notion of European identity. The second 
chapter is devoted to introduction and discussion of the theories by Richard Lewis, Geert Hofstede, as 
well as Ronald Inglehart’s World Values Survey. The third chapter aims at analysing Lithuanian national 
identity and its impact on Lithuanian – EU relations. First of all, this chapter analyses cultural factors 
shaping Lithuanian national identity based on secondary data analysis of the studies presented in the 
second chapter. In this chapter traumatizing historical experiences, especially the post-Soviet period, are 
also analysed as factors that contributed to the development of Lithuanian national identity. Further on, 
in order to investigate what kind of EU member Lithuania is and what is Lithuania’s position towards 
the European Union, this chapter concentrates on the secondary analysis of Eurobarometer and other 
documents of the European Commission published in different years to grasp the changes of Lithuanian 
values and views towards the European Union. Comparative analysis is also used in order to compare 
European and Lithuanian values and to examine if there is a clash between Lithuanian and European 
identities. Finally, this chapter investigates how Lithuanian national identity is reflected in Lithuanian 
foreign policy and international behaviour. 
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In the case of Lithuania, its national identity reflects traumatizing historical experiences 
and the values that were infused by the Soviet Union, as well as the values that were reinforced by 
fighting for independence. Not only national identity shapes Lithuania as a unique member of the 
European Union, but it also directly influences Lithuanian foreign policy. Despite the fact that Lithuania 
with its post-Soviet identity might still appear to be not a complete and modern member of the European 
Union compared to other, more economically and politically developed European Union members, 
Lithuania, because of the specific factors shaping its identity, became a member that is the most 
optimistic and supportive of the European Union, as well as one characterized by a strong protection of 
its national identity and empathy for the countries that have had similar historical experiences. As the 
transition is still ongoing: younger generations with modern values in Lithuania gradually change the 
older, more restrained generations infused with harsh memories of the Soviet Union, therefore, Lithuania 
will gradually become a fully integrated member of the European Union as it makes progresses in the 
democratisation process it started after independence in 1990. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In today’s globalized world, international relations is the most relevant field to discuss and analyse in 
order to understand the recent developments in global policy. Wrong foreign policy decisions can lead 
a nation to catastrophic situations such as financial bankruptcy, internal political instability, endangering 
of its own national security or suffering from military conflicts. Even one of these situations in itself can 
trigger one or several of the others, creating a devastating domino effect. In the end, all of this can 
threaten a nation’s existence. 
It is therefore essential that measures are taken to ensure that wrong foreign policy decisions are 
avoided. For such an endeavour, it is fundamental to make predictions of the response that a foreign 
policy decision made by a nation triggers in another nation. This response, which in the end is another 
nation’s foreign policy, is known to be the materialization of that country’s national interests. At the 
same time, these national interests are shaped by a country’s cultural values and historical experiences 
and struggles, which in the end construct the country’s national identity. Therefore, national identity is 
an important factor that impacts the foreign policy, which in turn shapes international relations. 
Lithuania is a clear example of this relationship between national identity and foreign policy. 
Lithuanian society infused with Soviet cultural values after decades of Soviet occupation, is since the 
independence of Lithuania in 1990 experiencing a transition of values from post-Soviet to modern and 
post-modern type of values, formed during the process of democratisation of Lithuania and its efforts to 
reach the closer European integration, characterised by higher degrees of protection of democratic values 
and of freedom of expression, and by more tolerant attitudes towards demographic minorities and 
individual personal choices. This process of European integration describes a set of foreign policy 
decisions taken by Lithuania after independence in an effort to protect its own existence as an 
independent nation, a clear case of foreign policy being shaped by national interests arising from national 
identity. 
Scientific originality of the final project: despite the fact that plenty of studies focus on the concepts 
of national identity, foreign policy, and even the relationship between the two, very few studies have 
been published that cover in detail Lithuanian national identity. What makes the Lithuanian case a 
particularly interesting, is the fact that in Lithuanian society changes in cultural values are clearly visible 
across generations. This is related with the changes in the society, once infused with Soviet values, 
undergoing the process of European integration, while in the recent society there is still a strong 
remembrance of historical experiences and struggles that remind Lithuanians of those traumatising 
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events which make Lithuania a rather constrained, individualistic society with a constructed self-image 
that often translates into a low self-esteem and pessimistic mindset. 
Practical significance of the final project: understanding how the process of society’s cultural values 
have an impact on foreign policy making is fundamental not only to understand current realities, but also 
to be prepared to understand, analyze and even make predictions about future geopolitical events and 
changes. Particularly in the case of Lithuania, it is necessary to understand how Lithuanian national 
identity was formed in order to fully grasp the reasons that have led to the current geopolitical situation 
of Lithuania and its foreign policy making. 
The problem examined in the research paper: how Lithuanian national identity impacts Lithuanian - EU 
relations. 
The aim of the research: to analyse the mutual impact of Lithuanian national identity on relations with 
the European Union. 
Research tasks:  
- to investigate the evolution of Lithuania’s national identity; 
- to analyze Lithuanian national identity from cultural and historical perspectives; 
- to consider how Lithuanian national identity is reflected in Lithuanian - EU relations; 
- to perform an analysis of Lithuanian foreign policy; 
- to investigate the impact of Lithuania’s EU membership on its own national identity 
Research object: Lithuanian - EU relations 
Research subject: Lithuanian national identity 
The following research questions are considered in order to achieve the findings exposed throughout 
this paper: 
1. What is the role of national identity in international relations? 
2. What are the factors shaping Lithuanian national identity? 
3. Can Lithuanian national identity be responsible for the position of Lithuania in terms of 
Lithuanian - EU relations? 
4. How national and European identities are related? 
Structure of the final project: the project consists of three main parts. The first part provides theoretical 
background on the main concepts related to the topic. The second part of this thesis overviews the main 
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studies in the field of identity for further research. The third part analyses impact of Lithuanian national 
identity on Lithuanian - EU relations, as well as the cultural and historical factors contributing to the 
formation of Lithuanian national identity. 
  
1. THEORIZING NATIONAL IDENTITY 
 
This chapter aims at providing the main theories and terminology necessary to comprehend the topic. In 
order to define the ambiguous concept of national identity, the logical sequence of providing theory has 
to be followed. Firstly, this section defines nation and nationalism. Then, the concepts of identity and 
national identity are explained. Next, the role of national identity in international relations is identified. 
Finally, this section also conceptualizes the meaning of European identity in order to perform a 
comparative analysis of Lithuanian national identity and European identity as well as the compliance of 
values. 
1.1 Defining nation and nationalism 
 
A theoretical framework is needed in order to perform the research on Lithuanian national identity. A 
logical starting point would be the definition of the concept “nation”. Since the word “nation” has a Latin 
root natio, which means “people”, the concept of nation might be often confusing. The meaning of nation 
is far from physical: Benedict Anderson (1991) states that nation is imagined because “the members of 
even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear them, 
yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (p. 133).  Dictionaries such as The Penguin 
Dictionary of International Relations (1998) state that nation refers to “a social collectivity, the members 
of which share some or all of the following: a sense of common identity, a history, a language, ethnic or 
racial origins, religion, a common economic life, a geographical location and a political base” (p. 27). 
Similarly, author Anthony D. Smith (1992), a representative of the essentialist approach, which 
emphasizes ethnic-cultural variables, provides several dimensions for the concept of “nationhood”: 
• the territorial boundedness of separate cultural populations in their own ‘homelands’; 
• the shared nature of myths of origin and historical memories of the community; 
• the common bond of a mass, standardized culture 
• a common, territorial division of labour, with mobility for all members and ownership of 
resources by all members in the homeland; 
• the possession by all members of a united system of common legal rights and duties under 
common laws and institutions (p. 60). 
These dimensions are quite distant from each other and separately might provide five different 
definitions for the concept of “nationhood”, therefore, author Anthony D. Smith summarizes all these 
five dimensions into a single, clear definition and finally conceptualizes “nation” as “a named human 
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population sharing a historic territory, common memories and myths of origin, a mass, standardized 
public culture, a common economy and territorial mobility with common legal rights and duties for all 
members of collectivity” (Smith, 1992, p. 60). What all these definitions have in common, is that the 
definition of the concept of nation cannot be strictly limited to a very specific, unique idea, but a concept 
that must be understood as a set of characteristics that a group of individuals share together. 
On the other hand, is nation really just a population unified by certain cultural elements? According 
to Herbert C. Kelman (1997), a nation, in which “communication is smoother and more comfortable 
among individuals within than across these boundaries” cannot develop unless “its members share 
important aspects of culture” (p. 169). However, Kelman argues that these aspects of culture may vary 
in different nations: “no one aspect is crucial to the definition of a nation; there are a variety of elements 
that are functionally equivalent as bases for communication” and that “a group may constitute a nation 
even if its members do not share the same language and religion, as long as they share other important 
values and experiences that provide a ready-made basis for communication among them” (Kelman, 
1997, p. 169). Kelman exemplifies his statement with Switzerland and Germany, which unarguably both 
are nations, despite Switzerland having linguistic division within it or Germany, despite its religious 
differences. If not specific cultural elements, then what makes nation a nation? Kelman emphasises that 
the most significant element which constitutes a nation is “the consciousness of being a nation”, 
consciousness that “these cultural elements represent special bonds that tie them to one another” 
(Kelman, 1997, p. 169). The same idea was also expressed long before in Floyd Allport’s Institutional 
Behavior (1933): 
The main criteria of nationality are psychological. There are certain traditions, historical 
perspectives, and principles possessed in common by members of every national group which are 
both the evidence and the substance of their nationality. If an individual shares these ideas with 
the others of his group, and like others is loyal to them, he belongs to their nation; otherwise, he 
does not belong to it, even though he may be of the same race of his fellows, speak the same 
language, and live in the same territory. […] Individuals belonging to a certain nation are aware 
that they belong to it and, furthermore, this awareness is an essential part of nationality itself (p. 
138). 
Like Kelman, Allport highlights cultural elements as the basis for the definition of nationality, going 
further to specify them: traditions, historical perspectives and shared principles. The conclusion that can 
be extracted from the analysis of the elements that define nationality and those that do not, with abundant 
real cases throughout the world supporting this notion, is that nationality is not necessarily a tangible 
element, such as a territory, or even a language or a religion, but psychological elements that are 
collectively nurtured through shared values and experiences, forming a sense of a common cultural 
identity across the members of these collectivities. 
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It is also important to discuss the difference between nation and nationality. Both of the words 
have a Latin root meaning birth and origin, therefore, these two concepts might be confusing, resulting 
in mistaken reference to nationality as citizenship, however, there is a thin line which draws a distinction 
between the concepts of nation and nationality. Carlton J. H. Hayes in Essays on Nationalism (1962) 
defines nationality as “a group of people who speak either the same language or closely related dialects, 
who cherish common historical traditions and thus constitute a distinct cultural society” (p. 5). What is 
more, Hayes points out that “a nationality by acquiring political unity and sovereign independence 
becomes nation state” (Hayes, 1962, p. 5). In line with this definition, the difference between nationality 
and nation lies within the political status of the collectivity in question. If that collectivity has its own 
sovereign state, it is a nation, but if on the other hand it belongs to a wider political organization and has 
no complete sovereignty of its own, it is a nationality. From this understanding of the concepts nation 
and nationality, appears the idea of a nation-state that can encompass several nationalities within it. It is 
important to point out, however, that there is not a wide academic consensus over the definition of these 
concepts, and as previously mentioned, the concept of nation is often simply used as a synonym of 
sovereign state, and the concept of nationality is simply used as a synonym of citizenship. 
The ambiguity of terms such as nation can be noticed for instance in the case of Lithuania. During 
the period in which Lithuania was part of the Soviet Union, it lacked complete sovereignty of its own, 
yet it was widely conceived as a nation by its own population. It is therefore logical to define the concept 
of nation beyond the strict definition of a nationality with a sovereign state, and widen it to encompass 
those nationalities that, despite not being sovereign states by themselves, aspire to achieve a sovereign 
status and perhaps eventually, if under that sovereignty they choose to, become independent nation-
states. 
While speaking of nationalism, “the movement that brings nations into being” (Triandafyllidou, 
1998, p. 595), which can be seen as inseparable to nation, it is worth mentioning Hans Kohn (1891-
1971), a philosopher the most famous for his contribution to nationalism studies and analysis of two 
different types of nationalism – civic/Western and ethnic/Eastern. As political scientist Craig Calhoun 
states, Hans Kohn was “the most influential source of both the opposition of civic and ethnic nationalism 
and of its association with a parallel opposition between western and eastern varieties of modernity“ 
(Calhoun, “Foreword” in Kohn, Idea of Nationalism, ix). In Kohn’s view, “Western nationalism had a 
social base in civic institutions and a bourgeoisie. In contrast, in the East the absence of these institutions 
and social classes meant that its nationalism was more ‘organic’ and reliant upon intellectuals to 
articulate a national idea” (Kuzio, 2002, p. 22). Kohn lists the following main differences between 
civic/Western and ethnic/Eastern nationalism: 
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• In the West nationalism was a political phenomenon and was preceded by the launch of nation-
building, or coincided with it; 
• In the East nationalism arose later, in conflict with existing states and within the cultural 
domain; 
• Nationalism in the West did not dwell on historical myths whereas the opposite was true of 
nationalism in the East; 
• Nationalism in the West was linked to individual liberty and rational cosmopolitanism whereas 
in the East the opposite was the case (Kuzio, 2002, p. 15). 
Kohn’s perspective illustrates that the difference between Eastern and Western nationalism is 
mostly politically based, since it is precisely the political realities that lead each nation towards one kind 
of nationalism or the other. To illustrate Western nationalism, which originated in England in the 
eighteenth century, Kohn provides five cases: France, Netherlands, Switzerland, United States and the 
United Kingdom, and explains, that in these countries, “the rise of nationalism was a predominantly 
political occurrence; it was preceded by the formation of the future nation state, or, as in the case of the 
United States, coincided with it (Kohn, 1961, 329). Kohn continues to point out that “nationalism in the 
West arose in an effort to build a nation in the political reality and the struggles of the present without 
too much sentimental regard for the past” while in the East, “nationalists created often out of the myths 
of the past and the dreams of the future, an ideal fatherland, closely linked with the past, devoid of any 
immediate connection with the present and expected to become sometime a political reality” (Kohn, 
1961, p. 330). Therefore, Kohn clearly separates Western and Eastern nationalism depending on whether 
the national political aspirations are shaped by current social struggles in the first case, or by an idealized 
political and social future scenario in the latter. 
However, the explanation for the origins of nationalism received different perspectives than that 
of Hans Kohn. Authors such as Ernest Gellner (1983), agrees on the division of nationalism to the 
Western and Eastern dichotomies but argues that in the West, nations were linked by “fully effective 
high culture”, which only needed “an improved bit of political roofing”, while in the East, nationalism 
was “active on behalf of a high culture not as yet properly crystallised” and was “in ferocious rivalry 
with similar competitors, over a chaotic ethnographic map of many dialects, with ambiguous historical 
and linguo-genetic allegiances, and containing populations which had only just begun to identify with 
these emergent national high cultures” (p. 99-100). In conclusion, the basis for Eastern nationalism arose 
from ethnic related factors, mostly due to the fact that there was not a completely established high culture 
creating a cohesive enough environment for it to generate by itself a sense of a shared identity among 
the members of a collectivity, while the basis for Western nationalism, given the fact that there was a 
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better established high culture, partly due to a better defined distinction between social classes and a 
well-established bourgeoisie, did not need to rely upon ethnic related factors, and in and of itself that 
high culture was able to generate a sense of a shared identity linking together a collectivity, allowing 
Western nationalism to be nurtured under social struggles of each period of time. 
Despite this seemingly opposing views, Kohn’s perspective pointing out that the difference 
between Eastern and Western nationalism is mostly political, and Gellner’s perspective stressing that 
the difference between these two types of nationalism is mostly cultural, are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive. As a matter of fact, the cultural scene is inherently bound to the cultural values of a society, 
which in turn these cultural values shape the political scene. The same is true viceversa, as political 
events and struggles influence and motivate the cultural scene of a nation. Given this correlation, the 
difference between Eastern and Western nationalism can be understood both as a cultural and as a 
political phenomenon. 
1.2 Defining identity and national identity 
Identity, on the other hand, has many various types but is based on two levels: individualistic, which 
derives from “interpersonal relationships and interdependence with specific others” and collective, 
deriving from “membership in larger, more impersonal collectives or social categories” (Brewer & 
Gardner, 1996, p. 83). The concept of identity at first might seem clear and understandable, but if asked, 
not everyone could provide a clear definition to this notion. As a matter of fact, identity is a complex 
phenomenon, studied and discussed by many researchers and sociologists, given the fact that there are 
many distinct definitions as well as theories related to identity. According to the Oxford English 
Dictionary, the origin of the concept of “identity” dates back to the late sixteenth century and owns a 
Latin root “identitas”, from Latin idem “same”. To draw logical connections from the origin of the 
concept of “identity” to the meaning of it, author Richard Jenkins provides two essential meanings: 
• the sameness of objects, as in A1 is identical to A2 but not to B2; 
• the consistency or continuity over time that is the basis for establishing and grasping the 
definiteness and distinctiveness of something (Jenkins, 2014, p. 18). 
Richard Jenkins then draws the conclusion that the “notion of identity involves two criteria of 
comparison between persons or things: similarity and difference” and adds that the verb “to identify” is 
“a necessary accompaniment of identity, which allows us to identify our similarities and differences to 
others, and finally ourselves” (Jenkins, 2014, p. 18). analysing the origin of identity and the reasons for 
its existence, Jenkins defines identity as “our understanding of who we are and who other people are, 
and reciprocally, other people’s understanding of themselves and others (which includes us)” (Jenkins, 
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2014, p. 19). Author Jeffrey Weeks also supports the idea of similarities and differences while analysing 
identity but adds that identity is also about a sense of belonging: 
Identity is about belonging, about what you have in common with some people and what 
differentiates you from others. At its most basic it gives you a sense of personal location, the stable 
core to your individuality. [...] At the centre, however, are the values we share or wish to share 
with others (Weeks, 1990, p 88).  
 
Moreover, David Buckingham (2008) the author of Youth, identity and digital media  argues that identity 
is not only about similarities, differences and belonging, but that “identity also implies a relationship 
with a broader collective or social group of some kind“ and adds, that “when we talk about national 
identity, cultural identity, or gender identity, for example, we imply that our identity is partly a matter 
of what we share with other people. Here, identity is about identification with others whom we assume 
are similar to us (if not exactly the same), at least in some significant ways“ (Buckingham, 2008, p. 1). 
Given all these definitions, the concept of identity, regardless of the type of identity considered, 
can be summarized as the notion an individual or a set of individuals have of their belonging to a 
collectivity with which they share certain elements such as values, goals, struggles or experiences. 
Hence, the specific case of national identity, could be summarized as the notion that individuals have 
regarding their belonging to a larger group of people with whom they share to a certain degree elements 
like the ones mentioned. In this case, these would include historical experiences, ethical or moral values, 
common political grounds and others. 
However, as discussed previously, nation is a “social collectivity”. For this reason, this thesis will 
focus specifically on national identity as a collective phenomenon. As this study has already defined 
nation and identity separately, it is finally possible to define the concept of national identity. If identity 
is defined as a sense of belonging to a certain group, then national identity is about a sense of belonging 
to a certain nation. Ilya Prizel (1998) points out that “nations may derive their sense of identity from 
common language, religion, geographic location, collective memory, cultural practices or a myth of 
common ancestry”, however, “it is the interaction with the outside world, namely the acceptance or 
rejection of “the other” that allows polities to develop a sense of national uniqueness” (p. 16). Despite 
many theories and differences, sociologists agree that for national identity, firstly it is essential to be 
aware of the difference between “us” and “them”, just then it is possible to concentrate on what makes 
us “us” and what factors contribute to the formation of national identity. 
Analysis of specific national identity is challenging to perform since identity is a constantly 
changing matter. While John Joseph (2004) states that “identity is in fact fixed and given, is imposed on 
us by birth and does remain essentially unchanged there-after” (p. 119), David H. Kaplan (1999) argues 
that “despite its seeming fixity, national identity is extraordinary fluid. It changes over time, 
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incorporating different groups, different territories, and different geographical imaginations.” (Kaplan, 
1999, p. 32) Kaplan continues to point out that “a given national identity cannot be essentialized, it 
cannot be containerized, it is always a subject to modification, and is always conceived differently by 
those groups within it” (Kaplan, 1999, p. 32). For this reason, to analyse a specific national identity, it 
is necessary to investigate what elements influence the formation of national identity the most. Anna 
Triandafyllidou (1998) identifies several elements that construct national identity: “cultural traits, myths, 
traditions, historical territories form an integral part of the distinction between ‘us ’  and ‘them’ ” (p. 
597). The author explains that these elements “give to the contrast between the nation and the ‘others’ a 
concrete form and, at the same time, they are shaped by this contrast so that they further reinforce it” 
(Triandafyllifou, 1998, p. 597). However, American political scientist Francis Fukuyama identifies three 
elements important for the formation of national identity: “nation-building goes further and involves a 
shared sense of national identity, built on elements that tie people together - such as shared culture, 
language, and history - that cannot be imposed from without“ (Powell, 2012). Consequently, analysis of 
Lithuanian national identity will be specifically based on these three elements. As it will be later revealed 
in this study, language, history and culture had a significant effect in shaping Lithuanian national identity 
and developing Lithuania as a unique actor in international relations. 
However, there are several factors which pose a threat to national identity. One of these challenges 
could be identified as globalization. The concept of globalization, which is defined as “increasing cross-
border flows of goods, services, money, people, information, and culture” (Held et al., 1999, p. 16), 
according to Gal Ariely (2012), puts national identity at risk: “globalisation is seen as undermining 
national identity because, put briefly, the cross-border flow of information makes it harder for any single 
national identity to retain its unique significance and distinguish itself from other national identities“ (p. 
462-463). What is more, even though globalization and European Union are two distinct matters, Ariely 
states that there are also similarities between them like “the increasing communication beyond the 
national borders that led research to expect the decline of national identity“ and that “the emergence of 
the European Union led to growing interest in the question of its impact on the national identity of 
citizens in the member states“ (Ariely, 2012, p. 465). Therefore, European identity and European 
integration might have an impact on national identity, phenomenon that is further analyzed in this thesis. 
Another element that has an influence on national identity is immigration. Clara Sandelind (2015) 
states that “national identity and immigration are interdependent concepts, meaning that changes in how 
national identity is understood may also change how immigration affects national identity“ (p. 4). 
Sandelind continues to point out that “those individuals who understand their national identity as 
foremost civic are more positive to admitting immigrants than those with an ethnic identity“ (Sandelind, 
2015, p. 4), since the immigrants might possibly not have the same shared values than those mainly held 
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in a nation with an ethnic national identity. An example of, as one could say, excessive protection of 
national identity related to immigration can be seen in Brexit: an opinion poll conducted 8 years before 
Brexit referendum revealed that “almost two-thirds (60%) of the young people surveyed in the poll by 
the British Council thought the presence of foreign immigrants was "diluting" their sense of national 
identity“ (Mail Online, 2008). Interestingly however, it was the vote of the elder part of the British 
people, which balanced the result of the Brexit referendum towards the option of leaving. This is possibly 
due to the growing open-mindedness of younger people and a stronger attachment and protection of 
national identity of the older ones. This fright to lose national identity is likely to have been a determining 
factor that led British people to vote in favour, although by a very small margin, of the United Kingdom 
leaving the European Union, and at the same time a mobilising factor of certain individuals and groups 
of extremists within the country who took racism motivated actions  such as discriminating and even 
using violence against people in Britain belonging to demographic minorities despite their citizenship 
or birth place, or even the killing of a Member of Parliament, Jo Cox, who campaigned during the 
referendum in favour of the United Kingdom remaining inside the EU. This is a clear example of how 
promoting a particular perspective over national identity, for instance by  promoting fear through an 
alleged risk of losing national identity, can put a nation’s stability and social cohesiveness at risk. 
1.3 Relation between national identity and international relations 
 
In order to understand what is the relationship between international relations and national identity, a 
theoretical framework needs to be presented. International relations (IR) theory focuses precisely in 
analyzing this relationship. Authors Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (2008) argue that state and 
IR theory are significantly related: 
The state is central to the study of international relations and will remain so in the foreseeable 
future. […] States decide to go to war. They erect trade barriers. They choose whether and at what 
level to establish environmental standards. States enter international agreements, or not, and 
choose whether to abide by their provisions, or not (p. 41). 
According to Jonathan Cristol, international relations theory is “often thought as a theory that seeks both 
to explain past state behaviour and to predict future state behaviour” (Cristol, 2011). The author 
furthermore explains that “traditional IR theories can generally be categorized by their focus either on 
humans, states or the state system as the primary source of conflict” and that realism, liberalism and 
constructivism are the three main theories of IR theory. (Cristol, 2011) Jack Snyder (2004) in his work 
One World, Rival Theories, provides detailed explanations for these three theories. Snyder states that the 
core of realism is “the belief that international affairs is a struggle for power among self-interested states” 
(p. 55). Liberalism theory is about “spread of democracy, global economic ties” and the belief that 
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“international organizations will strengthen peace” (Snyder, 2004, p. 59). However, the theory which 
focuses not only on the relationship between the state and international relations but also on the role of 
nation identity in international relations is constructivism, which claims that cultural and social factors 
construct international relations: “Constructivists view nations and national identities as constructs, 
forged by elites to achieve various socio-political and economic objectives” (Mole, 2012, p. 5). 
Moreover, constructivism states that “international politics is shaped by persuasive ideas, collective 
values, culture, and social identities” (Adler, 1997, 319).  
 What is more, anarchy is an essential concept in IR theory.  A political scientist, one of the 
most well-known IR constructivists, Alexander Wendt, in Social Theory of International Politics (1999) 
develops a cultural theory of international politics complementing constructivism and provides three 
“cultures of anarchy”, which explain the interaction between states. These are Hobbesian, Lockean and 
Kantian (Wendt, 1999, p. 257). Wendt links the concept of “culture“ to “a subset of social structure, 
socially shared knowledge“ (Wendt, 1999, p. 141). He explains that the Hobbesian culture is the one in 
which states view each other as enemies. According to Wendt, “enemies are constituted by 
representations of the Other as an actor who (1) does not recognize the right of the Self to exist as an 
autonomous being, and therefore (2) will not willingly limit its violence toward the Self“ (Wendt, 1999, 
p. 260). States try to conquer or destroy the ones they view as enemies and power becomes “the key to 
survival” (Wendt, 1999, p. 262). The Lockean culture is based on rivalry as a role structure. Wendt 
explains that “like enemies, rivals are constituted by representations about Self and Other with respect 
to violence”, however, the states who view Others as rivals, do not try to conquer or destroy them because 
“these representations are less threatening: unlike enemies, rivals expect each other to act as if they 
recognize their sovereignty, their “life and liberty,” as a right” (Wendt, 1999, p. 279). Finally, the view 
as friends of each other is stated in Kantian culture. Wendt explains that “friendship is a role structure 
within which states expect each other to observe two simple rules” (Wendt, 1999, p. 298). These rules 
are “the rule of non-violence”, which means that “disputes will be settled without war or the threat of 
war” and “the rule of mutual aid”, when states “will fight as a team if the security of any one is threatened 
by a third party” (Wendt, 1999, p. 298-9).  These three “cultures of anarchy” are fundamental to fully 
explain and understand the concept of constructivism, as they help to avoid the ambiguity that its general 
definition can possibly generate, and to thoroughly explain the three main different perspectives that all 
together form the concept. 
Why then, national identity is important for international relations? According to Xintian Yu 
(2004), “in constructivism theory, national interest is directly instituted by national identity” and 
“interest that is defined by the actor’s identity shapes its behaviour” (p. 71). Xintian emphasises that 
identity and interest have no meaning if they exist separately: “identity is combined with interest to 
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construct an actor’s action. Without interests identities have no motive and without identities interests 
have no direction” (Yu, 2004, p. 71). Furthermore, Alexander Wend states that interests, which depend 
on identities can also explain behavior: “interests are dependent on identities and so are not competing 
causal mechanisms but distinct phenomena - in the one case, motivational, in the other, cognitive and 
structural - and, as such, play different roles in explaining action“ (Wendt, 1994, p. 385). Another author, 
William Bloom (1993), reveals that national interest “can be perceived as being a part of national identity 
and thus is capable of triggering mass mobilization to defend or enhance it” (p. 83). Coming back to Ilya 
Prizel’s words that “it is the interaction with the outside world, namely the acceptance or rejection of 
“the other” that allows polities to develop a sense of national uniqueness”, it is visible that national 
identity has a significant effect on foreign policy. Correspondingly to William Bloom, Prizel states that 
“foreign policy, with its role as either the protector or the anchor of national identity, provides the 
political elite with a ready tool for mass mobilisation and political cohesion” and that “all countries 
frequently use national identity to articulate their foreign policies and in turn, rely on foreign policy as 
a foundation of their legitimacy” (Prizel, 1999, p. 19). As suggested by these authors, national identity 
is crucial for international politics: it significantly influences foreign policy, which is a crucial element 
that materializes national interests.  What is more, national identity can also be used to explain a certain 
nation’s behaviour and responses to actions in international relations. 
Interestingly, some scholars refer to national identity as state identity. Maxym Alexandrov (2003) 
explains that national identity and state identity “often, if not always overlap to a certain degree” (p. 36), 
but these concepts are not equal: “the shared narratives of national identity that bind the “imagined 
community” together do also relate this community to other nations, while state identity understood as 
shared beliefs about the Self and the Other can play an important role in sustaining “we-ness” of national 
community” (Alexandrov, 2003, p. 36-7). The author points out that this confusion arises because of the 
contrasting research objectives: “to a certain degree this distinction results from the different theoretical 
concerns and research priorities across the disciplinary fields of political science and international 
relations”  and that “those scholars concerned with domestic politics, nationalism or ethnic conflict see 
identity as “national”, while scholars of foreign policy and international relations discipline emphasize 
the external dimension of identity” (Alexandrov, 2003, p. 37).  
Maxym Alexandrov provides a figure summarizing theoretical approaches to national, or so to 
say, state identity in IR theory: 
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Figure 1. The main directions of research of identity in international relations theory. Source: Maxym 
Alexandrov, (2003), The Concept of State Identity in International Relations 
As seen in Figure 1, and as discussed previously, most theoretical approaches agree that culture and 
norms shape state identity, while state identity shapes state’s interests and state’s interests directly 
influence state action, which manifests in state’s foreign policy. By researching national identity, it is 
possible to understand and explain a nation’s specific actions and, possibly, even draw future predictions. 
The interconnection between the concept of state identity and national identity is therefore evident, 
as national identity creates a state’s image in relation to other states, which in itself creates state identity. 
Likewise, the consolidation of that state identity gives coherence and provides the cohesiveness that 
strengthens national identity. 
1.4 The concept of the European identity 
 
European identity as an idealistic idea was kept alive by such politicians as Jean Monnet, Walter 
Hallstein and others, but it was first implemented only in 1973 in the Copenhagen European Summit, 
where nine member states of the European Union defined European identity (EI). Fundamental elements 
of EI are “rich variety of national cultures”, “same attitudes to life, based on a determination to build a 
society which measures up to the needs of the individual”, determination to defend “the principles of 
representative democracy, of the rule of law, of social justice” and “respect for human rights” 
(Declaration on European identity, 1973). Some authors (Ramanauskas, et al. 2000), despite the 
complexity of the term, attempted to provide a description of the concept of European identity: 
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a) it does not have the attributes of the national identity (such as common culture, language, 
history, religion, etc.), and therefore European identity and national identity are qualitatively different 
and do not overlap; 
b) European identity is based first of all on common values typical of a democratic society, and 
therefore applicable in every nation (though there might arise a question of what are the typical  
European values); 
c) European identity does not exclude cultural, lingual and other differences among nations, 
accepting their distinctiveness (p. 11). 
Therefore, even though European identity cannot be equivalent to national identity because of the 
absence of a common language, religion or history, the European union still shares “common features 
as of a democratic society”, altogether with “living in one continent” and “tolerance and respect for 
individuality and distinctiveness” (Ramanauskas, et al. 2000, p. 11) 
It might seem that European identity is rather an idealistic goal viewed through rose-tinted glasses 
because of the European Union consisting of many value systems that are all unique and one of a kind. 
Then how is it possible to implant this single value system, common identity that would embrace the 
values that are older and closer to the member states constituting the European Union? This aim being 
difficult to achieve, the European Union seeks to implement this single common identity through 
politics, by infusing values into the areas of economy, law, education and other spheres. However, there 
is still a distinguishable line between historical experiences and the perception of geopolitical threats 
between Eastern and Western societies. 
For instance, while countries in Western Europe have had during long periods of time a good 
relationship with Russia, as their geopolitical and financial interests were favourable to seeing Russia as 
a good ally, and even looking to the other side when Russia was being widely accused of abusing human 
rights during the Chechen wars, Eastern European countries that were former Soviet Republics that had 
gained independence, saw Russia as an aggressor and as a threat to their own existence. 
However, as pointed out in the previous definitions, European identity and national identity are 
not mutually exclusive concepts. In fact, they complement one another. Regardless of the differences 
that make each national identity unique, European identity provides on top of each national identity the 
sense of belonging to a wider group of nations that have in common a set of democratic values that they 
are supposed to cherish and protect. 
Author M. Kohli (2000) argues that this European identity creates a “sense of a direct opposition 
between (Western) Europe and the outside world” (p. 128). Kohli then points out that “Immigrants from 
other Western European Countries are not seen as ’foreigners’ in the ethnocentric sense any more” 
(Kohli, 2000, p. 128). Interestingly, as Kohli suggests, the European Union has created a sense of a 
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European identity that sets the European Union as a united entity and sets it apart from the rest of the 
world, and at the same time changes national perceptions from EU populations of citizens of an EU 
member state who immigrate into another EU member state. As a matter of fact, the following table 
shows this distinction in perceptions of populations from EU member states of those immigrants who 
are citizens of other EU member states, and those who are citizens of non-EU countries: 
Table 1. The view of European member states towards immigrants. Source: Eurobarometer 86 (2016) 
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As the table shows, the percentage of citizens from a given EU country viewing positively immigrants 
from other EU countries is higher than the percentage of citizens from that same EU country viewing 
positively immigrants coming from outside the European Union. In the case of Lithuania, for instance, 
it can be noticed that the percentages of people having a negative or positive view of immigrants from 
the EU is nearly inversely proportional to the negative or positive view of immigrants from non-EU 
countries. 
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2. OVERVIEW OF THE THEORIES RESEARCHING IDENTITY 
 
Despite the difficulty in limiting the scope of a concept that can be relatively ambiguous, several theories 
and models could be further discussed which  help to understand the importance of cultural dimension 
and the system of values in particular, while researching identity. The common approach in many of 
those theories is the research of cultural values. The result might be helpful, in a context of international 
relations, to predict and determine possible behavioural models related to foreign policy decisions. 
2.1 Richard Lewis model and dimensions of state behaviour 
 
As discussed previously, culture is an important factor shaping national identity. Therefore, analyzing 
Lithuanian culture allows us to investigate the attributes of Lithuanian national identity. Richard Donald 
Lewis, a social theorist, is mainly known for his “Lewis Model of Cross-Cultural Communication“ 
where he classifies the cultures into Linear-Active, Multi-Active and Reactive. Lewis explains the 
importance of culture shaping national identity and consequently nations’ actions in international 
relations: “people of different cultures share basic concepts but view them from different angles and 
perspectives, leading them to behave in a manner which we may consider irrational or even in direct 
contradiction of what we hold sacred” (Lewis, 2005, p. xvi). What is more, the author explains that “by 
focusing on the cultural roots of national behavior, both in society and business, we can foresee and 
calculate with a surprising degree of accuracy how others will react to our plans for them, and we can 
make certain assumptions as to how they will approach us“ (p. xvi). Therefore, Lewis suggests that a 
nation can plan its international relations with another nation by taking into account that other nation’s 
cultural values, as on them will depend the other nation’s response to the first nation’s foreign policy 
plan, allowing for a calculation of the other nation’s response before it even takes place. 
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Table 2. Lewis classification of cultures. Source: Lewis, R., (2005), Leading across cultures.  
LINEAR-ACTIVE MULTI-ACTIVE REACTIVE 
Talks half the time Talks most of the time Listens most of the time 
Does one thing at a time Does several things at once Reacts to partner’s action 
Plans ahead step by step Plans grand outline only Looks at general principles 
Polite but direct Emotional Polite, indirect 
Party conceals feeling Displays feelings Conceals feelings 
Confronts with logic Confronts emotionally Never confronts 
Dislikes losing face Has good excuses Must not lose face 
Rarely interrupts Often interrupts Does not interrupt 
Job-oriented People-oriented Very people-oriented 
Sticks to facts Feelings before facts Statements are promises 
Truth before diplomacy Flexible truth Diplomacy over truth 
Sometimes impatient Impatient Patient 
Limited body language Unlimited body language Subtle body language 
Respects officialdom Seeks out key person Uses connections 
Separates the social and 
professional 
Mixes the social and 
professional 
Connects the social and 
professional 
 
As seen in the table 2, the three types are very distinct from one another. Evaluating the three from an 
emotional intelligence perspective, that is, by their capacity to control their emotions in their responses, 
a state with a Multi-Active culture would be the one with the least emotional intelligence, as it has traits 
such as confronting emotionally rather than logically, is impatient and often interrupts, therefore, acts 
impulsively. A state with a Reactive culture would be the one with the most emotional intelligence, as 
it shows traits such as a preference for listening over talking, not interrupting, avoiding confrontation, 
hence, preferring diplomacy in all cases and working for de-escalation of conflicts. Finally, the state 
with a Linear-active culture would have a level of emotional intelligence in between the levels of the 
other two types, since its behaviour shows traits that are sometimes more diplomacy-oriented, but in 
other occasions the reactions are more impulsive and emotionally uncontrolled. 
What is more, Lewis created the color coding scheme which allows to determine the cultural type 
of a specific country. According to Cross Culture website founded by Richard Lewis, the colors in the 
scheme have a specific purpose: “blue is a cool colour denoting calm factual planners, discreet but in 
control.  Red signifies warmth, emotion, loquacity, perhaps passion. Yellow indicates soothing harmony, 
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sought by courteous, accommodating listeners” (Lewis, 2017). This color coding scheme will be later 
used in this thesis to analyse Lithuania from a perspective of cultural behavior. 
2.2 World Values Survey on how human development may lead to democracy 
 
Another research related to values is World Value Survey (WVS). WVS is a global project first 
conducted in 1981, which sought to analyse countries according to their values and beliefs. This study 
performed by various social scientists is based on surveys in almost 100 different countries, and allows 
to measure such factors as the impact of globalization, attitudes towards politics, national identity and 
others. What is more, WVS is a project widely used by governments, students, journalists, as well as in 
policy making to build a better society while taking into account the wide diversity of cultures. Political 
scientists Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel analysed the data of WVS and created a map where 
they classified countries according to the values and beliefs prevailing in each country regardless of its 
geographical position. Scientists distinguish two major dimensions for countries to be assigned to: 
traditional versus secular-rational values and survival versus self-expression values (Inglehart and 
Welzel, 2010, p. 553). Traditional versus secular-rational values reflect the contrast between the 
countries based on the importance of religion. What is more, countries assigned to traditional values are 
the ones with a low tolerance for phenomena such as abortion, divorce and euthanasia. However, these 
countries place a significant importance on traditionally conservative views on the concept of family, 
relations between parent and child, together with a possible self-characterization as a nationalist country. 
(Inglehart and Welzel, 2010, p. 553) Countries assigned to secular-rational values are opposite to the 
countries having traditional values. Not only secular-rational countries have a high tolerance for 
phenomena such as gay marriage, abortion and others, but also, they place less emphasis on religion and 
traditionally conservative views on family. Secular-rational countries place a significant importance on 
environmental protection and participation related to decision making in both economic and political 
life. Survival versus self-expression values portray the shift from the emphasis on economic and physical 
security to the importance of the subjective well-being and quality of life. While countries with survival 
values emphasise hard work in order to survive, countries with self-expression values highlight such 
factors as imagination and tolerance towards values that are necessary for children’s education. 
(Inglehart and Welzel, 2010, p. 553) 
The economic growth of the past decades in most western countries has meant a shift in which 
younger generations take survival for granted and adopt self-expression values in which tolerance and 
respect towards demographic minorities such as the LGBT community or foreigners prevail. It is 
precisely this shift towards self-expression values that creates societies more politically concerned with 
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social and environmental issues. This political activism often contributes to the democratization of 
societies. 
2.3 Geert Hofstede and six dimensions of national culture 
 
Geert Hofstede is a Dutch social psychologist which developed a cultural dimension theory. He argues 
that the core element of culture is precisely values. Hofstede (2010) explains that “our own culture is to 
us like the air we breathe, while another culture is like water - and it takes special skills to be able to 
survive in both elements“ (p. 23). Hofstede created six dimensions based on values in  order to 
understand cultural differences. This study based on “various paper-and-pencil questionnaires” that were 
developed to find out “people’s preferences among alternatives”, was performed  taking into account 
common problems prevailing in different societies (Hofstede, 2010, p. 28). These were as follows: 
• Social inequality, including the relationship with authority 
• The relationship between the individual and the group 
• Concepts of masculinity and femininity: the social and emotional implications of having 
been born as a boy or a girl 
• Ways of dealing with uncertainty and ambiguity, which is related to the control of aggression 
and the expression of emotions (Hofstede, 2010, p. 30). 
Geert Hofstede at first created four dimensions related to these problems: power distance, 
collectivism versus individualism, femininity versus masculinity and uncertainty avoidance. However, 
later, long-term orientation vs. short-term orientation and indulgence versus restraint were added as two 
additional dimensions resulting in the six-dimensional model (6-D) (Hofstede, 2010) 
The first dimension, power distance, is defined as “the extent to which the less powerful 
members of institutions and organizations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed 
unequally“ (Hofstede, 2010, p. 61).  The higher level of power distance, the more people accept the 
hierarchical order, where every person has a social structural role they must accept, while the low level 
of power distance shows that society is unhappy with inequality of power. 
Another dimension provided by Hofstede is individualism versus collectivism. As Hofstede 
explains, individualism “pertains  to societies in which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone 
is expected to look after him- or herself and his or her immediate family“ while collectivism “pertains 
to societies in which people from birth onward are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, which 
throughout people’s lifetime continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty” (Hofstede, 
2010, p. 92) Therefore, in an individualistic country, a person’s identity can be less impacted by peer 
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pressure, as that person is not necessarily promising “unquestioning loyalty” to a social group. These 
countries prefer tasks over relationships and are characterized by independence and personal opinion. 
Oppositely, in a collectivist country, identity is much more impacted by the pressure of the surrounding 
social system and opinions are influenced by social groups. What is more, a collectivist country 
emphasizes harmony within a group and considers relationship more important than tasks. 
The third dimension is identified as masculinity versus femininity. Hofstede states that a society 
can be considered as masculine “when emotional gender roles are clearly distinct: men are supposed to 
be assertive, tough, and focused on material success, whereas women are supposed to be more modest, 
tender, and concerned with the quality of life“, while feminine society is “when emotional gender roles 
overlap: both men and women are supposed to be modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life“ 
(Hofstede, 2010, p. 140) Therefore, according to Hofstede in a masculine society there is a predominant 
and noticeable emotional disparity between genders and more predefined established gender roles, while 
in a feminine society there is a less emphasized emotional divergence between genders, and gender roles 
are not as predominant or relevant as in a masculine society. 
The fourth dimension according to Hofstede is uncertainty avoidance. A description for this 
concept provided by Hofstede is as follows: “the extent to which the members of a culture feel threatened 
by ambiguous or unknown situations“ (Hofstede, 2010, p. 191). Therefore, societies with low index of 
uncertainty avoidance are flexible and the ones not fearing to take risks. This type of society is more 
relaxed and its average stress level is not as high. Oppositely, a society with a high index of uncertainty 
avoidance is filled with anxiety and stress, strictly follows the rules and laws and strongly believes in 
knowledge rather than in common sense. 
Another dimension Hofstede identified is long term orientation versus short term orientation. 
Hofstede explains that long term orientation “stands for a society in which wide differences in economic 
and social conditions are considered undesirable“, while short term orientation “stands for meritocracy, 
differentiation according to abilities“ (Hofstede, 2010, p. 246). A society characterized as having short 
term orientation values norms and time-valued traditions altogether with prioritising quick results over 
long term benefit. This type of society also views societal change with suspicion. On the other hand, a 
society having long term orientation emphasizes education as a way to prepare for the future and has the 
ability to adapt traditions according to changed conditions. 
Finally, the last dimension of 6-D model is indulgence versus restraint. According to Hofstede, 
a society with a high score of indulgence has “a tendency to allow relatively free gratification of basic 
and natural human desires related to enjoying life and having fun“, while a restraint society reflects “a 
conviction that such gratification needs to be curbed and regulated by strict social norms“ (Hofstede, 
2010, p. 281) This means that an indulgent society has a weaker control over its impulses than a society 
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which is restraint, while a society that is restraint in some ways does not allow itself  to feel gratified. 
As it will later be seen in this thesis, Lithuanian historical experiences and fear to lose national identity 
are visibly reflected in Hofstede’s research. 
 
 
 
  
3. ANALYSIS OF LITHUANIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY AND ITS IMPACT ON 
LITHUANIAN – EU RELATIONS 
 
The importance of the concept of identity lies within its usefulness to understand the mindsets and the 
idiosyncrasies found in a collectivity of people. Through finding these, a picture can be formed of the 
cultural values of a society, which, altogether with the nation’s historical experiences and struggles, 
creates a national identity. At the same time, this national identity is essential to understand not only the 
internal politics of the nation, but also its attitudes and behaviours in regards to its foreign policy. Given 
Lithuania’s membership to the European Union, the shaping of Lithuania’s foreign policy through its 
national identity implies that the power of influence that Lithuania has to shape European Union policies 
is impacted by Lithuania’s national identity. Likewise, the impact of all national identities of European 
Union member states creates a set of common values of the European Union which reciprocally impacts 
Lithuania’s national identity and therefore the cultural values of the Lithuanian society. 
3.1 Methodology of analysis 
 
A country’s history and cultural values are reflected in its national identity. In turn, that national identity 
shapes the country’s national interests and policy making decisions, not only at a level of internal 
politics, but also at a level of foreign policy. This correlation between national identity and foreign policy 
making implies that a country’s cultural values and historical experience shape its international relations 
with other countries. The aim of this thesis is to analyse the way in which this correlation takes place 
and the implications it has in international relations, in order to examine how Lithuania’s national 
identity shapes its relation with the European Union, and how that relationship itself impacts Lithuanian 
national identity. 
Systematic data analysis was used to provide the theoretical background on the topic and define the 
terminology necessary to comprehend the topic and the aim of research. 
Secondary data analysis was used in order to find out the attitudes of Lithuania towards the European 
Union, what historical and cultural factors contributed to Lithuanian national identity formation and 
their effect on international relations. 
For the secondary data analysis the following data sets are used: 
1) The Candidate Countries Eurobarometer (1998, 2004);  
2) Eurobarometer survey on European Union Citizenship (2012, 2016); 
3) WVS data set (1996, 2015) provided by Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel; 
4) Hofstede data set on six dimensions of national culture (1991). 
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Comparative analysis was used in order to check if Lithuanian national identity and values comply with 
European identity and its values. For this analysis the following data set was used: 
1) Standard Eurobarometer on the values of Europeans (2012). 
 
As the research on identity is difficult to perform due to the ambiguity of the concept, the first logical 
step in the analysis of how a nation’s national identity impacts international relations, is to examine the 
national identity of the country itself. Based on the theoretical foundation provided in this thesis, the 
variables allowing to grasp a country’s national identity are culture and values, altogether with historical 
experience. To analyse Lithuanian national identity, several authors have been taken into account.  
The Lewis model classifies countries into three distinct types according to their behaviour rather 
than on nationality or religion. This research performed by Richard Lewis (2005) is significant because 
Lewis explains what to expect from each country and how to communicate with it in international 
relations because of its specific cultural type. 
Values, being one of the most important element of culture, have a significant impact on a nation’s 
national identity formation. Ronald Ingehart and Christian Welzel maps (1996; 2015) based on World 
Values Survey (WVS) is a research project devoted to mapping out the countries according to their 
values and beliefs. This project observes how these values and beliefs change over time and how they 
influence social and political areas altogether with culture, diversity, support of democracy, tolerance 
and others. WVS distinguishes countries according to traditional versus secular-CErational and survival 
versus expression values. 
 Geert Hofstede (2010) is widely known for his “cultural dimensions theory”. Hofstede’s work is 
relevant as it describes how national values differentiate one country from another based on six 
dimensions Hofstede created.  
What is more, this study focuses on Lithuania’s position towards the European Union which is 
influenced specifically by Lithuanian national identity. To grasp the change of Lithuanian national 
identity and values after the post-Soviet period, Eurobarometers of different years (1998; 1997; 2004; 
2009; 2012; 2016) have been analysed. This thesis also focuses on the relationship of Lithuanian values 
and national identity with European values and identity. The secondary data analysis of Standard 
Eurobarometer (2012) is used in order to support the facts and claims.  
Because of national identity directly influencing foreign policy, this research project will also 
perform an analysis of Lithuanian foreign policy in order to detect how Lithuanian national identity 
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constructed by cultural and historical factors reflects in decisions and behavior of Lithuania as a member 
of the European Union. 
The findings and results of all these research projects have proven to be vastly useful to make the 
hypotheses and reach the conclusions available throughout this paper regarding the impact of Lithuanian 
national identity on the Lithuanian - European Union relations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The sequence of analysis of Lithuanian national identity and its impact on international relations 
(created by author) 
 
As seen in figure 2, this thesis argues that Lithuanian national identity is shaped by the historical and 
cultural factors. Next, Lithuanian national identity shapes Lithuanian national interests which then 
construct Lithuanian foreign policy. Therefore, it is visible that Lithuanian national identity directly 
influences Lithuanian foreign policy. Primarily, analysing the factors that shape Lithuanian national 
identity, it is then possible to investigate Lithuanian actions in international relations and Lithuanian 
foreign policy, and to grasp those specific features of Lithuanian national identity that are responsible 
for the specific behaviour of Lithuania. This sequence of analysis allows to define Lithuania as a member 
of the European Union and explain the current actions of Lithuania as well as to foresee further 
developments. 
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3.2  Factors shaping Lithuanian national identity 
The question that remains essential in national identity research might be identified as “what are the 
variables for measuring national identity?”. Are Lithuanians defined and recognized by others just by 
Lithuanian passion for basketball and beer? Or are Lithuanians viewed by others as a pessimist, 
constrained and conservative post-soviet nation? How to tell if these identifications are not just artificial 
stereotypes? Furthermore, how does national identity affect international relations? To answer these 
questions, an analysis on national identity needs to be performed to a greater extent. 
3.2.1 Cultural factors shaping Lithuanian national identity 
 
Culture is a part of national identity and is also about a sense of belonging:  Author L. Robert Kohls 
(2001) reveals that culture is “an integrated system of learned behaviour patterns that are characteristic 
of the members of any given society” (p. 25). What is more, culture refers to “the total way of life or 
particular groups of people” and includes everything that a group of people thinks, says, does and makes 
- its system of attitudes and feelings” (Kohls, 2001, p. 25). Kohl continues to point out that culture is 
“learned and transmitted from generation to generation” (Kohls, 2001, p. 25). Brooks Peterson (2004) 
adds that values take an important part in shaping identity: “culture is a relatively stable set of inner 
values and beliefs generally held by groups of people in countries or regions and the noticeable impact 
those values and beliefs have on the peoples’ outward behaviors and environment” (Peterson, 2004, p. 
17). Therefore, analysing a nation’s cultural aspects, for instance its values, allows an understanding of 
its national identity, since that national identity is majorly composed precisely by those cultural values. 
Author Richard Lewis assigns countries into three different categories according to their cultural 
types, designates a color to each category type the warmth of which being related to the characteristics 
of each culture, and creates a series of tonalities between these color assigned categories to designate the 
cultural types with features that are in between two of the three main cultural types: 
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Figure 3.  Lewis coding scheme for cultural types. Source: Source: Lewis, R., (2005), Leading across 
cultures. 
Countries such as Germany, Switzerland, Luxembourg, being widely perceived as punctual, task-
oriented and organised planners are classified as Linear-Active cultures. In fact, considering again the 
parallelism with emotional intelligence, these countries are, according to Lewis, “calm factual planners, 
discreet but in control”, attributes that denote high levels of emotional intelligence. Italy, Spain, Brazil, 
Mexico and others belong to the Multi-Active type and possess characteristics such as emotionality, 
impatience and talkativeness, attributes that Lewis associates with “warmth, emotion, loquacity, perhaps 
passion”, features that denote impulsiveness and therefore lower levels of emotional intelligence. 
Finally, Vietnam and Japan are Reactive countries and are identified as listeners, introverts and the ones 
concealing feelings, values that Lewis associates with “soothing harmony, sought by courteous, 
accommodating listeners” and which denote higher levels of emotional control and hence less volatility 
in their decision-making. Lithuania is in between Linear-Active and Multi-Active cultures, although 
leaning more towards a Multi-Active type, which implies that it has some characteristics associated with 
higher levels of emotional intelligence, but also on some occasions reacts in a more impulsive manner. 
Interestingly, Lithuania is not on the same side of the previous graphic as Latvia and Estonia. As 
Lewis (2006) points out “Lithuanians, an emotional and grandiloquent people, feel more at home with 
Slavic Poles and Russians than they do with Latvians and Estonians” (p. 356). As a matter of fact, despite 
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sharing a common part of their recent history as former Soviet republics, Lithuania has some historical 
heritage that sets it apart from its Baltic neighbours. For instance, while Latvians and Estonians were 
nations that had Lutheranism as the most common religious practice, Lithuania was a nation that had 
Catholicism as its main religious practice. Moreover, Lithuania was part of the Polish-Lithuanian 
commonwealth, while the other two Baltic nations had stronger influence from the Finnish in the case 
of Estonia, and from German colonizers in the case of Latvia. This divergent historical heritage helps 
explain the difference in cultural values between the three Baltic republics, and why Lithuania is 
considerably different from its Baltic neighbours. In fact, considering the classification suggested by 
Lewis, it can be observed that while Latvia and Estonia are grouped next to each other and close to 
Finland and Germany, Lithuania is grouped together with Poland, France and Hungary. Each of the 
coloured circles groups together countries that share historical resemblances such as main religious 
practices. The proximity between these coloured groups in the graphic is proportional to the resemblance 
of their cultural values. 
Table 3. Lewis identification of Lithuanian values. Source: Lewis, R., (2005), Leading across cultures. 
Preservation of national identity Hospitality 
Generosity Family 
Catholicism Spontaneous attitude 
Strong historical consciousness Sentiment 
Music (esp. choirs) and dancing Morality 
Love of nature Romanticism 
 
These cultural values, identified by Lewis as Lithuanian values, are shared to a greater extent with the 
previously mentioned nations that Lewis groups altogether with Lithuania, or that he places to other 
groups close to the group in which Lithuania is placed in the previous graphic. 
Another researcher, Geert Hofstede (2010) has performed a deeper analysis of the values 
prevailing in the country and followingly has extracted these values into the 6-dimensional model, which 
are significantly useful in defining national identity of a specific country, and in this case, of Lithuania.  
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Figure 4. Lithuania according to Hofstede’s 6-D model. Source: Geert Hofstede’s 6-D model (2010) 
As seen in figure 4, with a score of 42 of Power Distance, a low score that implies that the Lithuanian 
society has a low acceptance of the idea that the less powerful within the Lithuanian society must expect 
and accept an unequal distribution of power favouring the most powerful. Therefore, Lithuanians favor 
equality in governance and decision-making. 
At a score of 60 of individualism, the Lithuanian society scores highly in an index that measures 
whether a society is defined by close ties (lower levels of individualism) or loose ties (higher levels of 
individualism) between social groups going beyond individual families. Therefore, the Lithuanian is a 
society characterised by loose relationships between individuals and between different family units, 
which is often translated into a stronger cohesion within each family unit and by an attitude of respect 
to privacy between different families. 
The masculinity vs femininity index measures societies by their prevalence of values associated 
to “achievement, heroism, assertiveness, and material rewards for success” in the case of masculinity, 
as opposed to a prevalence of values associated to “cooperation, modesty, caring for the weak and quality 
of life” in the case of femininity (Hofstede, 2017). With a low score of 19 in masculinity, Lithuania is 
therefore portrayed as a society in which prevails cooperating and consensuating among members of 
society over competitiveness. 
The Uncertainty Avoidance dimension defines societies by their level of tolerance towards the 
unpredictability of the future. Higher levels in the Uncertainty Avoidance index implies the preference 
for rigid structures that avoid as much as possible uncertain scenarios, therefore a society with a high 
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level is uncomfortable with change, while a lower Uncertainty Avoidance index portrays societies that 
are more flexible to changing scenarios, applying pragmatic solutions over rigid structures that avoid 
changing scenarios. With a high level of 65%, the Lithuanian society is portrayed precisely as one that 
is uncomfortable to possible and actual changes, therefore having lower tolerance of ideas that are 
unconventional compared to those prevalent in the Lithuanian society. Therefore, the society adheres 
strongly to its principles and is slow to adapt them to an ever-changing environment of global changes. 
An example of this is the slow changing mindset towards acceptance of demographic minorities such as 
the LGBT community in Lithuania. 
In the Long Term Orientation vs Short Term Normative Orientation dimension, societies are 
measured by the way they react to social changes that challenge established traditions. A higher index 
of Long Term Orientation implies that a pragmatic approach prevails in adapting the social behaviour to 
better confront the challenges of the future, from the encouragement to financial savings to a modern 
educational approach. In opposition, a lower Long Term Orientation index implies a stronger adherence 
to historical traditions and a reluctant attitude to confront the challenges of the future. With a high level 
of 82 of Long Term Orientation, the Lithuanian is portrayed as a society that has willingness to be 
prepared to upcoming challenges, promoting austerity to deal with possible financial problems and 
facing an evolving world through modernising its educational system. 
Finally, the Indulgence vs Restraint dimension portrays societies regarding their approach to 
allowing gratification. Higher levels of indulgence imply a generalized social acceptance to gratification, 
while lower levels imply a social attitude that in a way promotes a constrained behaviour in individuals. 
With a low score of 16, Lithuania is portrayed as a very constrained society, in which values such as 
hard work are socially promoted in detriment of life enjoyment activities. 
Stereotypes often encountered since the times of the Soviet Union categorize Lithuanians as 
pessimistic regarding their own self-image. Anecdotal evidence suggests Lithuanians frequently 
describe themselves as conformists and frustrated about their daily lives. Even sarcastic anecdotes have 
arisen from these negative stereotypes in which Lithuanians are portrayed as “the ones who laugh when 
their neighbor’s house is on fire”. While some of the stereotypes might be considered as true, most of 
them are not. However, these derogatory stereotypes construct negative images about Lithuanians both 
by Lithuanians’ themselves and by foreign nationals. According to a survey performed by A. Čiužas and 
V. Ratkevičienė in 2005, which sought to identify the features of Lithuanian national identity, 60% of 
Lithuanian respondents defined themselves as angry, jealous, selfish, apathetic and antisocial. Only one 
third of respondents identified themselves with features such as honesty, diligence, intelligence, 
hospitality and ability to save up (Čiužas, Ratkevičienė 2005, 236). 
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It shouldbe noted that these previously analyzed models partly contradict these constructed 
stereotypes Lithuanians often have about themselves. It is true that the models suggest that Lithuanians 
are not keen on allowing gratification, which in part confirms the stereotypes of a pessimistic and 
restraint post-Soviet society, and that Lithuanians are individualists and as such, social ties are very 
loose, explaining the antisocial self-image the previously mentioned survey describes. However, it is 
also true that the models suggest that Lithuanians, unlike the picture painted by the previous survey, are 
featured as a hospitable and generous society in the Lewis model, and according to Hofstede’s 
dimensions, as a society that values an equal distribution of power, with a high level of femininity 
implying a cooperative and caring society, and a social culture with a high Long Term Orientation score, 
indicating a society that is willing to be prepared to tackle challenges of the future, thus contradicting 
the constructed self-images that show a small amount of Lithuanians being hospitable or a large amount 
of Lithuanians considering themselves selfish or apathetic. 
As previously described, national identity is constructed mainly through cultural values and 
historical experiences. All these analyzed factors describing the social culture of Lithuanians, and also 
the historical experiences that have contributed to Lithuanians’ pessimistic views on their own self-
image, in the end construct Lithuania’s national identity. 
3.2.2 Historical factors shaping Lithuanian national identity  
 
Historical experiences and struggles have a high relevance in the construction of a nation’s identity. In 
general, without the acknowledgement of these past experiences, it is not possible to get a clear picture 
to fully understand the present. In the particular case of national identity, analyzing these experiences 
helps to understand the current values, attitudes, behaviours and the mindset of a society that in essence 
construct its national identity. 
In the map version of 1996 created by Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, Lithuania is assigned 
to the cluster of Ex-Communist countries. Unlike its Baltic neighbours, Lithuania is grouped in the 
Catholic Europe group, given the historical religious differences that sets it apart from Latvia and 
Estonia, historically mostly Lutheran. 
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Figure 5. Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel cultural map, (1996). Source: World Values 
Survey, wave 4 
Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel’s cultural map categorizes countries regarding the elements that 
predominantly shape their cultural values. On the one hand, there is the aforementioned value of the 
religious historical background of each country. On the other hand, the cultural values of a society are 
predominantly defined over two main dichotomies: the Survival vs Self Expression values, and the 
Traditional vs Secular-Rational values. Lithuania according to this map based on the cultural context of 
the year 1995, is defined as a country with secular-rational values but with deeply ingrained Survival 
Values as opposed to Self Expression Values. That positions Lithuania along with its Baltic neighbours, 
unsurprisingly given their recent historical ties regarding decades of Soviet Occupation and a common 
struggle for independence. 
As a matter of fact, ties between the Baltic nations remain strong over time after the post-Soviet 
era. Such is their closeness in cultural values, that in the Inglehart and Welzel’s map culturally based on 
the context of the year 2015, they are grouped together as Baltic nations instead of grouping them 
according to their religious background. 
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Figure 6. Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel cultural map, (2015). Source: World Values 
Survey, wave 6 
It is worth noticing that, while essentially all the Baltic countries remain as societies with predominantly 
Secular-Rational and Survival values, Estonia and Latvia, with higher scores of Survival values than 
Lithuania in the 1995 version of the cultural map, are in the 2015 version placed beyond Lithuania in 
terms of Self Expression values. The comparison between the 1995 and the 2015 maps demonstrates 
that essentially in terms of cultural values, all the Baltic nations have remained in the same side of the 
dichotomies presented by the model of Inglehart and Welzel, which at the same time allows for the 
conclusion that two decades working for European integration, even though the process has yielded 
results in terms of social progress impacting their national identity, have not supposed the disappearance 
of the core cultural values of these nations. 
History is an essential factor contributing to the formation of national identity. British professor, 
Anthony F. Upton (1999) states that “there cannot be a nation without a national history.“ (p. 153) Author 
continues to point out that history defines nation: 
This will show, by illustration, what the defining characteristics of the nation are and will confer 
legitimacy on the nation by describing its origins and development over time and in the processwill 
define the nation’s place in the world alongside, and in competition with, other nations. History 
will define the friends and enemies of the nation and illustrate the conditions necessary for its 
survival and prosperity. It will suggest the values that have contributed to success and the failings 
that have endangered its well-being. History tells the nations what kind of people they are, what 
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sort of policies they must pursue if the nation is to survive, and it delivers graphic warnings about 
nations which fail to read the lessons of history aright, which lose sight of their national destiny 
and perish as a consequence. For a nation, the knowledge of its history is held to be a matter of 
life and death. (Upton, 1999, p. 153) 
What is more, author Ilya Prizel continues to point out that “a polity’s national identity is very much a 
result of how it interprets its history – beliefs and perceptions that accumulate over time and constitute 
a society’s “collective memory” (Prizel, 1998, p. 14). Prizel and Upton confirm the idea that, apart from 
cultural values, national identity is constructed also through a nation’s history. As a matter of fact, 
cultural values and historical experiences are inherently intertwined, as the analysis of the first has 
indicated that they are partly the result of the second. Indeed, in Lithuanian national identity formation, 
history plays an important role. Lithuania, territorially the biggest country of the Baltic states, was the 
first mentioned in 1009 in the German chronicle named Annals of Quedlinburg, recording the death of 
Christian missionary named Bruno (Kasekamp, 8). Even though more than a thousand years have passed 
since Lithuania was born, the path to independence and freedom has been a difficult one. To this day, 
Lithuania is still widely associated with the Soviet Union. Even though Lithuania experienced different 
forms of relationship with Poland and Germany throughout its history, it was the period when Lithuania 
was under the influence of imperial Russia that gave rise to Lithuanian nationalism. 
 It all began after World War I, when the Lithuanian geopolitical situation and advantageous 
international circumstances allowed it to seek for independence. Therefore, on February 16th, in 1918 
the Council of Lithuania declared independence. In December of the following year, Soviet armed forces 
invaded the borders of Lithuania and the war between Lithuania and the Soviet Union began, and was 
followed by two decades of tensions with Germany, Poland and the Soviets. According to Nazi-Soviet 
treaty, which was regulated by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, in September 28th of 1939, Lithuania, 
together with Latvia and Estonia, was passed into the “Soviet sphere of influence”. (Senn, 1990) From 
this point in history, the Soviet Union’s efforts to put Lithuania under its influence reached its climax. 
In order to weaken Lithuanian nationalism, the Soviet Union arrested and sent to prison political 
activists, intelligentsia and other figures that were considered “enemies of the people”. What is more, 
forced settlements in the Soviet Union began. As Timothy Snyder (2003) states, around “20,000 
Lithuanians had taken up arms against Soviet rule, of whom most were killed in action or sent to Siberia“ 
(p. 95). Snyder also points out that “between 1945 and 1953 about 120,000 inhabitants of Soviet 
Lithuania, or 5 percent of the republic’s population, were deported. Among the deported were many of 
Lithuania’s leading writers and scholars and 1,000 of Lithuania’s 1,300 Roman Catholic priests“ 
(Snyder, 2003, p. 95). However, these events fuelled Lithuanians to fight for their country and national 
identity. 
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As a result, Lithuanian partisans and other anti-Soviet groups such as Forest Brothers emerged. 
The main reason partisans fought against the Soviet Union and did not fear to sacrifice their lives during 
1944-1953 was the desire to restore Lithuania’s independence (Gaškaitė, 1996). Author Nijolė Gaškaitė 
emphasizes that it was not only partisans who fought against Soviet Union. Partisans also inspired 
Lithuanian civil disobedience against the Soviet Union, and as a result, many Lithuanians disobeyed the 
will of the occupier by boycotting military, political and economical requirements of the occupation 
regime (Gaškaitė, 1996). Partisans created this motivational energy which stimulated Lithuanians to seek 
the goal of wanting to belong together and together cater for one another, and at the same time, to defend 
Lithuania’s national identity.  
However, the Soviet Union sparked nationalism not only in Lithuania but also in the two other 
Baltic states suffering its occupation: Latvia and Estonia. On the 50th anniversary of Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact between Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, on 23rd of August, in 1989, “the Baltic 
republics organized one of the most effective publicity campaigns ever held” and resulted in “up to two 
million people, holding hands, created a human chain, from Vilnius, through Riga to Tallinn” (Dreifelds, 
1996, p. 34). In this way, these three countries sought to draw global attention to the fate of the Baltic 
states. Successfully, “this emotionally captivating scene was widely described not just by the Baltic 
media but also abroad.” (Dreifelds, 1996, p. 34) This event is a great example of previously discussed 
Anthony Upton’s quote stating that “history will define the friends and enemies of the nation and 
illustrate the conditions necessary for its survival and prosperity“ (Dreifelds, 1996, p. 153). Indeed, 
Lithuania until nowadays cherishes a close, brotherly relationship with Latvia and Estonia. Despite the 
further attempts of the Soviet Union to maintain Lithuania under its influence, Lithuanians overcame the 
struggles and on March 11th, 1990, Lithuania was the first one of the Baltic states to declare 
independence. 
According to Klumbytė (2003) Lithuanian identity in the early post-Soviet years was defined 
mostly as “the one who was Catholic, who spoke the Lithuanian language, and was of the common 
Lithuanian descent and culture” (p. 287). On the one hand, catholicism in Lithuania represented not only 
the most common religion practised in the country, but it also represented a symbol of defiance to Soviet 
occupation. A proof of that is the history of the Hill of Crosses, a spiritual place in Lithuania that was 
born precisely from this defiance towards Soviet occupation, a hill in which, in a back and forth manner, 
religious crosses were placed by Lithuanians and later taken down by Soviet soldiers in an attempt to 
suppress a part of Lithuania’s identity, its major religion, different from that of the most common 
religious practices in the Soviet Union or lack thereof. This fact in itself already portrays that Lithuania’s 
post-soviet culture was deeply affected by decades of Soviet occupation. On the other hand, as 
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Klumbyte’s quote shows, Lithuania’s identity had an ethnic component to it, as it was partly defined by 
an individual’s Lithuanian ancestry. 
However, despite the strong nationalism and Lithuania’s wish to belong to one nation, it is 
undeniable that this tension between Lithuania and the Soviet Union influenced Lithuanian national 
identity. Being under pressure of the Soviet Union for such a long time, mostly against its will, Lithuania 
was infused with foreign values, attitudes and culture. This can be seen in the survey performed by F. 
Björklund and V. Liubinienė (2004), where the authors sought to determine if the process of 
democratisation is related to the values change. The authors also performed cross-national comparison 
in order to confirm or deny the hypothesis raised by Ronald Inglehart, which states that the more 
democratical the country is, the more modern values prevail in it. This survey compares the three Baltic 
countries: Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.  
Table 4. Cross-national comparison of the Baltic States. Source: Björklund & Liubinienė, (2004). 
Country Lithuania Latvia Estonia 
Age  18–29  30–49  50–75 18–29  30–49  50–75 18–29  30–49  50–75 
Phenomena:  
Euthanasia 6.53 6.8 4.73 5.57 5.42 3.92 6.0 5.78 4.86 
Divorce 5.78  5.78 4.21 6.04  6.05 5.34  6.7  6.43 5.96 
Abortion 4.81  4.83 2.80 4.82  5.11 4.3 5.21  5.66 4.82 
Avoiding fares on 
public transport 3.72  3.27 1.97 5.1  3.94 2.44 4.66 3.73 2.58 
Homosexuality 3.66  2.38 0.97 3.05  2.18 0.91 4.08  3.03 1.74 
Prostitution 3.38  3.23 1.44 2.96  3.23 1.54 3.65  3.13 1.77 
Buying stolen  
goods  2.14 1.33 0.83 2.53  1.38 0.69 2.18  1.3 0.83 
Suicide 1.97  2.04 1.43 2.38  2.23 1.76 2.5  2.33 1.66 
Accepting bribes 1.8  1.63 0.82 1.58  1.1 0.69  1.74  1.33 0.78 
Claiming  
social benefits 1.82  1.48 1.2 2.89  1.98 1.27 2.56  1.61 1.19 
N 268  430 438 241  436 424 268  439 407 
 
As seen in the table above, age is the main factor revealing certain values inherent for a specific age 
group. In all three Baltic States, and especially in Lithuania, it is visible that the people of older age 
groups prefer traditionally conventional order and are against phenomena increasingly tolerated in a 
modern world such as abortion, divorce or claiming social benefits. According to the authors, and as 
discussed previously in this thesis, this might be due to the fact that Baltic States fall in the cluster of 
post-Soviet countries: “the existence of phenomena such as “homosexuality” or “prostitution” was 
denied in the Soviet Union” (Björklund and Liubinienė, 2004, p. 41). The denial during the Soviet Union 
of these issues that regardless of the lack of public acceptance of their existence were part of society that 
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had to be kept in clandestinity, explains why the current younger generations, who formed their system 
of values mostly not under Soviet occupation but during the post-independence period of 
democratisation in which these issues became increasingly discussed publicly, are more tolerant of them. 
Another element that contributed to Lithuanian national identity formation is language. John 
Joseph (2004) reveals that “a consistent theme within studies of national identity over the last four 
decades has been the central importance of language in its formation” (p. 94). However, the two 
variables, language and history are interrelated in shaping Lithuania as the EU member it currently is. 
The fight for Lithuanian language throughout history has been long and tough. Every threat and attempt 
to eliminate the Lithuanian language resulted in a growing Lithuanian perseverance to preserve it. For 
example, when the Soviet Union made efforts towards a process of Russification of Lithuania, it 
specifically targeted the Lithuanian language, because Soviets viewed language as a central element of 
Lithuanian national identity. Also in the period of 1864-1904, the printing in Lithuanian language, 
altogether with Latin and Samogitian dialect were forbidden by Tsar Alexander II. What is more, 
education and the import of printed matter in Lithuanian was also banned. Even though the Soviet Union 
put considerable efforts to erase Lithuanian national identity, these actions only fuelled Lithuanian 
willingness to resist the Russification. Lithuanians established underground schools called “daraktorių 
schools“, where their children could read, write and be educated in Lithuanian language. Another 
phenomenon known as “knygnešystė“ emerged. Lithuanian book smugglers, not fearing of fines, being 
deported to Siberia or even being killed if caught by Soviets, would secretly transport Lithuanian books 
printed in Latin alphabet in Prussian Lithuania to the remaining Lithuanian speaking areas. As Terry D. 
Clark (2006) explains, “the country’s incorporation into the Soviet Union and the replacement of 
Lithuanian with Russian as the language of political and economic discourse in 1940 once again 
presented the Lithuanian nation with a challenge to the survival of its identity“ (p. 165). The author 
points out that Lithuanian national identity survived because of “the period of the national reawakening 
and independence struggle“ (Clark, 2006, p. 165).  However, despite “the efforts to protect the nation 
from Polish cultural domination and Russian political domination“ it was “the strong attachment to the 
national language and the determination to protect it“ which allowed Lithuanians to protect and save 
their national identity (Clark, 2006, p. 165).  
This strong attachment of Lithuania to its national language plays an important role in shaping 
Lithuania as the actor of international relations. Lithuania’s behaviour such as the elimination of factors 
threatening national language could be seen as the consequences of traumatizing history and the fear to 
once again feel as if national identity is in danger. This could be seen particularly in the relationship 
between Lithuania and Poland. While currently the Polish minority in Lithuania constitutes 
approximately 6% of the population, Lithuania still fails in forgetting the unpleasant events prevailing 
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the past such as the disagreement over the Vilnius region. Furthermore, in 1989 Lithuania took the steps 
towards gaining independence, “the Gorbachev regime sought help from the Polish minority – one that 
would presumably be threatened by Lithuanian independence – to rally against it (Fearon & Laitin, 2006, 
p. 4). As authors James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin explain, “Poles were a disaffected minority, but 
the Soviets promoted Polish cultural life within Lithuania” (Fearon and Laitin, 2006, p. 4). Therefore, 
Poles became a tool for the Soviet Union to divide and then conquer Lithuania. Fearing of possible 
Lithuanisation and the ban of their own language, Poles supported the Soviet regime and strongly 
opposed Lithuanian independence. However, after Lithuania regained independence in 1990, the conflict 
related to Lithuanian/Polish issues arose once again: “Lithuanian nationalists sought to restrict the Polish 
minority and Lithuanize them” (Fearon and Laitin, 2006, p. 5). Even though “the constitution of 
Lithuania adopted in 1992 guarantees cultural minority rights and prohibits discrimination based on 
ethnicity” (Budraitytė & Pilinkaitė-Sotirovič, 2009, p.7), in 2001, the United States Department of State 
in a report named “Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor“ stated that “members of the Polish Parliament 
criticized the Government in February over alleged discrimination against the Polish minority” (United 
States Department of State, 2001). The tension prevailing in Polish – Lithuanian relations were regarding 
the Lithuanization of Polish surnames and restricted Polish education in Lithuania. Even after Lithuania 
joined the EU, it did not ratify the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. These political 
decisions are an element that makes it evident that Lithuanian national identity, still immersed in fears 
from the past, materializes into what some might consider over-protective legislation and foreign policy. 
In the end however, this demonstrates the impact that national identity has over foreign policy. 
3.3 Analysis of Eurobarometer - Lithuania and EU 
Right after regaining independence, in 1991, September 17th, Lithuania joined the United Nations (UN) 
and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Could it be that specifically the 
history and the fear to lose Lithuanian national identity had a significant effect on influencing Lithuania 
to join the European Union? In 1998, the European Commision performed a research, based on a “survey 
over the national identities and attitudes to European integration in the ten  applicant  countries  in  central  
and  eastern  Europe:  Estonia,  Latvia;  Lithuania,  Poland,  the  Czech Republic,  Slovakia,  Hungary,  
Slovenia,  Romania  and  Bulgaria  (CEECs)” (Unit, 1998, p. 5). This research sought to prove whether 
“the dimension of national identity, closely connected to the perception of sovereignty, will have a direct 
bearing of the applicant countries’ attitudes to European integration and the acceptance of the principles 
and obligations of EU membership by their elite and public” (Unit, 1998, p. 5). While countries such as 
Poland and the Czech Republic “considered themselves as always having been part of mainstream 
Europe and having contributed to its development”, on the contrary, national identity in Lithuania and 
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other Baltic states is “connected to the survival of the independent state”, therefore EU membership is 
“viewed as part of series of linkages to the western world considered necessary to ensure the continuation 
of their national independence” (Unit, 1998, p. 5). This survey on national identity draws a main 
conclusion that “because the applicant countries’ national identities have been forged on the basis of 
(often) difficult, (sometimes) dramatic, historical experiences, and that in many cases the process is far 
from finalised, it can be expected that the identity-dimension will take a special importance in the eastern 
enlargement of the EU“ (Unit, 1998, p. 5). Indeed, in 1995, Lithuania, with security being one of the 
main drivers, applied to join the EU. And in 2004 Lithuania joined both the European Union and NATO. 
Just before Lithuania’s accession into the EU, the European Commission in a report including 
Lithuania in 2004, “The Candidate Countries Eurobarometer“, argued that “the European Union was 
perceived as a political and security safeguard against the perceived Russian threat as well as a guarantee 
for social and economic stability“ (EC, 2004, p. 2). Lithuanian history is traumatising, full of torture, 
conquering and laws which resulted in Lithuania not having breaks of independence between wars and 
occupations from 1940. However, in order to preserve Lithuania’s independence, restored after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, Lithuanians took the risk and decided to belong to a union again. This 
time, unlike the belonging to the Soviet Union, in a sovereign manner instead of through a violent 
occupation, the Lithuanian people chose to become part of the European Union. What is more, the survey 
performed by the European Commission has shown that Lithuania was, among the ten New Member 
States (NMS), the one that had “the largest number of the EU supporters“, while “the most sceptical are 
residents of Estonia (31%) and Latvia (33%).“ (p. 8) This might be due to the “intense process of 
Russification of the population in Latvia and Estonia, mainly by the way of deportations of the Balts and 
settlements of Russians” resulting in 28% of Russians in the Estonian population and even 30% of 
Russians living in Latvia, while Lithuania is “populated by 8% Russians and 9% Poles” (Unit, 1998, p. 
14). Coming back to the survey of 2004, Lithuania also appeared to be one of the NMSs to have the 
“greatest expectations of advantages to be brought about by the EU membership” (EC, 2004, p. 8). 
However, if before 2004, Lithuanian future prospects in the EU seemed idealistic, the report of the 
European Commission on “European Citizenship” in 2012 revealed contradictory results. It appears, that 
Lithuania is among the countries who identify themselves with the European Union the least. The report 
states that “a fifth or more of respondents in the United Kingdom (22%), Lithuania (21%) and Hungary 
(20%) spontaneously said that they expected nothing of the European Union” (EC, 2012, p. 6). What is 
more, “the countries where respondents are the least attached to the EU are the United Kingdom (27%), 
Finland (33%), Cyprus (33%), Lithuania (34%), the Netherlands (35%), Sweden (37%) and Greece 
(37%)” (p. 8). Lithuania is also among the countries that are not strongly attached to the symbols of the 
European Union: “the countries where respondents identify the least with the European flag include the 
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Netherlands (29%), Finland (32%), Sweden (35%), Lithuania (35%) and Denmark (35%) (EC, 2012, p. 
42). While respondents in the United Kingdom (60%) are “particularly likely to define themselves only 
by their nationality; this mirrors the low European citizenship score recorded in the UK (42% of UK 
respondents feel that they are citizens of the EU, the lowest percentage in Europe)” (EC, 2012, p. 24), 
“the nationality-only option was also frequently mentioned in Lithuania (56%) and Ireland (52%), 
despite the high European citizenship score of 60% or above in those two countries (60% and 69% of 
respondents respectively see themselves as citizens of the EU)“ (EC, 2012, p. 24). Interestingly, even if 
the citizens of Ireland similarly to the ones from the UK defined themselves by their nationality, the UK 
decided to exit the European Union while Ireland opposed this decision. This might be due to a different 
understanding of the concept of nationality in Ireland. What is more, Ireland had a stronger sense of 
belonging to the EU, therefore, the strong attachment to nationality did not stand in the way of Ireland’s 
desire to belong to the European Union: a poll performed by European Movement Ireland claims that 
“88 per cent of Irish people agree that Ireland should remain a part of the EU” (European Ireland 
Movement, 2017).  
What raises concerns is that Lithuania has become a country belonging to EU, but is it feeling a 
complete member of the European Union? Lithuanian national identity and its position towards the 
European Union has experienced an evolution from the days it did not belong to the EU until now. 
Andrius Bielskis in the article “The European Union: A danger to the nation state and national identity?” 
(2003) stated that at least in 2003, before Lithuania joined the EU, there was a “widespread concern 
about a possible decline of the nation-state and national identity within the European Union in 
contemporary Lithuania” (p. 1). What is more, Bielskis discusses that “despite the fact that the majority 
of the Lithuanian public approves of its country joining the EU, it is still often perceived as a danger to 
national culture, national identity and independence” and that this is due to the fact that “any 
multinational political union still reminds the Lithuanians of the oppressive regime of the Soviet Union” 
(Bielskis, 2003, p. 1). However, even though six years of Lithuanian membership in the EU had passed, 
Lithuanian politician and philosopher Leonidas Donskis in 2010 stated that Lithuanians still live under 
the influence of Russia: in the field of Russian information and in the zone of Russian language rather 
than in the European and democratic, multilingual world. Leonidas Donskis (2010) continues to point 
out that Lithuania is a country manipulated by Russian special forces and therefore, the Lithuanian model 
of governance gradually becomes similar to the Russian one, rather than corresponding to the governing 
model of the neighbour countries situated in the north. Author states what is visible in the analysis of 
the polls and Lithuanian values: Lithuania is in the conflict with itself while balancing between the 
Western and Russian identification. Lithuania exists in tension: while Lithuanian political rhetoric could 
be considered Western, forces in both owned and international fields are weak regarding Western values. 
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Lithuanian political and administrative practices have progressed not much more than the Russian ones 
(Donskis, 2010). Lithuanian self-consciousness and ambitions are almost Western, while the line 
between the Russian and Lithuanian administrative and bureaucratic mechanism gradually becomes 
thinner. What is more, even though nowadays there are no possibilities for Russia to retrieve Baltic states 
by force, Russia still manages to prevent them becoming complete members of the European Union by 
buying local media and overpowering the sphere of information and in this way, affecting national 
identity and transferring the Russian system into a specific nation (Donskis, 2010). This results in 
Lithuania stuck in an endless cycle: it could be supposed that Lithuania is not becoming a Western nation 
because it is not capable of completing integration to the EU and its intellectual and political spheres, 
but the complete integration of Lithuania to the EU is prevented by the inner tensions which Lithuania 
is not capable of solving. 
Another important factor to mention while discussing how national identity affects Lithuanian – 
EU relations is the fact that Lithuania prioritises national identity over the European one. Interestingly, 
Lithuania could be seen as a country which is in the middle of a conflict: supporting EU but not feeling 
a part of the EU. According to a Eurobarometer (2016), Lithuania is one of the countries which support 
the European Union the most. In 2016, 58% of Lithuanians trusted the EU, while 23% did not. This 
result was the most positive among all the members of the EU. 74% of respondents claimed to be 
supporting the membership in the EU. Interestingly, Lithuanians of a younger age, better economical 
position and having a higher education, support the membership of Lithuania in the EU more. (EC, 2016, 
p. 23) However, only 32% of Lithuanians identify themselves with the EU, while national identification 
is prioritized by 78% of Lithuanians. The 8% percent of Lithuanians that do not identify themselves with 
the European Union at all mainly consist of older and unemployed people (EC, 2016, p. 16) Is this 
because of the fear of European identity threatening national one? Tibor Navracsics, EU commissioner 
for education, culture, youth and sport argues that European identity does not pose a threat to a national 
identity. He insists that European identity is “not threatening the identities we already have, but 
complementing and supporting them“, furthermore, Tibor emphasizes that we have to “put young people 
at the heart of this“. (Navracsics, 2016) While discussing the meaning of identity, Tibor Navracsics also 
remembers the case of Brexit stating that “many people in Britain and elsewhere in the EU seem to feel 
that different identities compete with each other. That a European identity indeed threatens the national 
one, as well as regional, local, cultural, ethnic, religious identities. And as a result they reject the 
European identity.“ (Navracsics, 2016) However, Tibor expresses his opinion that he rather believes that 
we can have multiple identities “enriching our existence” (Navracsics, 2016). 
One of the reasons of this low identification with the European Union might be due to the fact that 
Lithuania, being isolated from the West for decades of Soviet occupation and having a common history 
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with Latvia and Estonia, strongly identifies itself with the Baltic region. According to “New Baltic 
Barometer“ (1997), 57% of Lithuanians identified themselves with Balts, together with 64% of 
Estonians and 57% of Latvians. A significant number of 85% of respondents prioritised Baltic identity 
over European identity, the latter being prioritised by only 1% of respondents (Rose, 1997). Even though 
this study was performed over 20 years ago, before Lithuania joining the EU, and Lithuanian attitude 
towards the EU constantly evolves, it is worth to mention that Lithuania might still be considered as a 
young state where the older generations still remember the tough days of the Soviet occupation.  
Interestingly, Lithuanian national identity was also affected by the European integration. 
According to Eurobarometer (2004), “after regaining the independence, Lithuanians almost for 10 years 
were considered to be one of the most pessimistic and sceptic European nations“, however, the situation 
changed significantly because of Lithuania’s accession to the European Union. As the European 
Commission states, “Lithuanians have become not only the most optimistic among the three Baltic 
States, but also have found themselves among the most optimistic nations in Europe” (EC, 2004, p. 2).  
The European Commission reveals that this is the result of “progress in economy, diminished threats for 
the East and hopes for the better future stimulate not only the positive future outlook but personal 
responsibility as well“ (EC, 2004, p. 2). The results found in the Eurobarometer (2004) indicate that the 
optimism of Lithuanians regarding Lithuania’s political and social situation, specifically elements such 
as the financial status, employment conditions and threats to national security, is proportional to their 
acceptance of the European Union, as this progress towards better living conditions is partly associated 
with Lithuania’s membership to the EU.  
In order to examine if there is a clash between the Lithuanian and the European identities it is 
necessary to compare the values that are important for Lithuania and those important for the rest of the 
European Union. For this investigation, a figure has been created according to the Standard 
Eurobarometer 77 (2012): 
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Figure 7. Comparison of the average of European and Lithuanian values. Source: Created by the author 
gathering data from the Standard Eurobarometer 77 (2012) 
 
As a matter of fact, the 2009 Eurobarometer points out that for Lithuanians “the European identity should 
first of all be based on two keystones: democratic values and a high level of social protection”, while 
the average citizen of the European Union “attaches the same importance only to one of the elements 
cited: democratic values” (EC, 2009, p. 6). It is evident that for Lithuanians, the European Union is a 
project the aim of which is not only to promote democratic values, but also to ensure social protection. 
Therefore, the EU is perceived by Lithuanians as an important element to improve Lithuania’s standards 
of living. 
As seen in figure 7, the European Union and Lithuania prioritize values differently. Both the 
European Union and Lithuania prioritize as values human rights and respect for human life, but while 
the European Union as a whole places higher preference to the values of democracy, peace and equality, 
Lithuania prioritizes as a value individual freedom. The reasons that might lead Lithuanians to place 
individual freedom in a higher priority level than the average European Union citizen, are likely to be 
related to the recent historical experiences of Lithuania, given the fact that Lithuanians endured decades 
of Soviet occupation during which they had experienced a strong repression of individual freedoms such 
as the freedom of information, freedom of speech, and even the restriction of essential individual choices 
due to the nature of the functioning of the Soviet Union. 
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It is noticeable that Lithuanian national identity has experienced an evolution: from being the most 
optimistic country about joining the European Union, to the country which is among those member states 
that identify themselves in terms of nationality with the European Union the least. In the case of 
Lithuania however, supporting politically the European Union the most, its overall position towards the 
European Union is rather positive. The difference in values and in the position towards the European 
Union between Lithuania and older EU members can be explained by Lithuania’s slower transition 
towards adopting values of a modern Western country. While the recent negative historical experiences 
result in Lithuania still focusing more on security and individual freedom, Lithuania has to catch up with 
those countries that already went through this phase and can focus on feeling a fully integrated member 
of the European Union in terms of mainstream values found in the older member states. It is undeniable 
that Lithuanians still strongly identify themselves primarily by their nationality because the 
transformation towards Europeanization in Lithuania is still an ongoing process. However, the trust and 
identification with the EU has grown significantly compared to the first years of Lithuania belonging to 
the European Union. 
3.4 Impact of Lithuanian national identity on Lithuanian foreign policy 
Lithuania’s foreign policy decisions after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the restoration of the 
independence of Lithuania and the subsequent international recognitions of the Republic of Lithuania as 
an independent state, were precisely based on and inspired by the events that had taken place in its 
immediate recent history. Basing foreign policy decisions on recent historical experiences implies that 
there will be a certain degree of correlation between foreign policy and national identity, since the latter, 
as argued in previous sections of this thesis, is also constructed through historical experiences and 
struggles. 
One of the most relevant international actors in which Lithuania’s foreign policy has focused on 
is the European Union. European integration was a priority in Lithuania’s foreign policy after its 
independence, a process that proved to be successful with Lithuania’s accession to the European Union 
in 2004. This European integration, however, was not limited to accession to the European Union, but it 
was also characterised by a strengthening of relations with Lithuania’s neighbouring countries. The path 
to accession to the European Union required political changes in Lithuania to adapt the country to 
European standards, and the system of values in Lithuania, until then vastly influenced by decades of 
Soviet occupation that had strongly impacted Lithuanian society with a set of values that to a major 
degree had been common throughout the Soviet Union and its satellite states, was now progressively - 
and somewhat slowly - being replaced as major social values, especially visible in the attitudes of the 
younger generations of Lithuanians, by the values that were majorly present to a smaller or greater 
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degree throughout the members of the European Union. These changes in social values, many still 
ongoing up to the current day, ranged from the early social implications of a dramatic change from the 
Soviet communist economy to a globalising capitalist system, to the growing movements in western 
European democracies such as those for greater levels of respect and tolerance towards demographic 
minorities such as the LGBT communities or racial or religious minorities, for gender equality and 
greater integration of women into the workforce and the political life, and for greater levels of respect 
for democratic principles and rights such as political transparency, freedom of expression and freedom 
of information. 
These ongoing changes in Lithuanian society contrasted greatly by those present throughout the 
Soviet Union, which implied radical changes felt in many aspects of the life of Lithuanians. These 
changes in social values of the Lithuanian society, at the same time, signified a progressive change in 
Lithuania’s national identity, which in the end, shapes the national interests of Lithuania. It is precisely 
through foreign policy that these national interests are represented and defended, and it is also through 
foreign policy that engagements with international actors happen that shape the social values of the 
Lithuanian society, thus making evident the impact of national identity on foreign policy and vice versa. 
Lithuania’s original will of accessing the European Union and NATO were partly aimed at 
guaranteeing its survival as an independent small country in front of a greater military force that, 
previously in the form of the Soviet Union, had occupied its territory and imposed its rule, and that was 
now perceived as a threat to the newly independent republic. It is clear that the fear to that threat and the 
traumatising experiences of recent history had become ingrained in Lithuania’s national identity and, in 
turn, that national identity was shaping foreign policy decisions. 
Nonetheless, that experience as a former Soviet republic becoming independent and going through 
the process of European integration, placed Lithuania in a position where it could take a leading role in 
assisting other eastern European countries that had relatively similar historical backgrounds, especially 
countries that had been under strong influence of the Soviet Union, and that now wished for closer 
integration or better relations with the European Union. Such a position for Lithuania was an opportunity 
to give direction to its foreign policy. At the same time, this allowed Lithuania to be a leading voice 
within the European Union itself regarding issues related to these eastern European countries. For 
instance, in the most recent conflict in Ukraine erupting from the Euromaidan movement and resulting 
in the occupation of Crimea by Russian troops and the deadly conflict in eastern Ukraine, which 
worsened relations between the European Union and Russia to a historical critical low, Lithuania’s 
foreign policy had an important role in shaping the policy making of the European Union in regards to 
its relations with Russia, showing how Lithuania’s vision due to its recent historical experiences, in 
essence constructing its national identity, impacts and is manifested through its foreign policy. 
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Historical background constructed Lithuanian national identity in a way that Lithuania became 
empathetic to the countries that were under the influence of Russia. As Henning Boekle, Jörg Nadoll, 
and Bernhard Stahl state, national identity reflects on foreign policy discourse. The concept of discourse 
according to the authors is defined as “the term discourse here refers to a communicative interaction that 
argumentatively seeks to link the elements of identity and behavioural preferences in accordance with 
the societally accepted logic of appropriateness, based on national identity” (Boekle et al, 2001, p. 6), 
what is more, authors reveal that “by means of discourse analysis, it can be shown which values and 
elements of identity are basic for a society’s self-conception and which values or elements of identity 
are significant in certain contexts” (Boekle et al, 2001, p. 8). An example of national identity 
manifestation in political discourse can be seen in the speech of a former Lithuanian president. Despite 
the controversial past while being a Lithuanian president, Rolandas Paksas is an indelible part of 
Lithuanian history. Just before Lithuania’s accession to the European Union, former president Rolandas 
Paksas in his speech on European integration emphasized empathy as a significant feature of Lithuanian 
national identity: 
The prospect possibility of membership of the European Union and the prospect of closer 
association with the Union should become the instruments helping Ukraine and all the other 
countries willing that express willingness to enhance relations with the Union to move successfully 
towards achieving the set goal. We know this from our own experience. (H. E. Mr. Rolandas 
Paksas at the European Conference, 2003) 
As Paksas suggests, it is Lithuania’s own experience, which in essence evokes its national identity, that 
helps it understand the circumstances of countries with relatively similar background to Lithuania such 
as Ukraine that are considering taking a path towards european integration that Lithuania has already 
taken in the past. Hence, demonstrating that national identity clearly plays a role in the direction a 
country takes in regards to its foreign policy. 
    Another considerably important idea can be extracted from Paksas’ previous speech. He 
mentions the importance that the “prospect of membership” to the European Union has on the countries 
considering or undergoing a path towards closer european integration. Paksas’ speech hints at the idea 
that merely this willingness towards european integration can already become an instrument helping 
these countries improve certain national levels and standards of living. Therefore, it is noteworthy to 
emphasize the notion that not only national identity shapes national interests thus giving direction to 
foreign policy, but also that national interests shaping foreign policy, such as the ones in play in a path 
towards european integration, also have an impact on a society’s values and in consequence on national 
identity. 
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The idea that a country’s fears and struggles from past experiences, ingrained in its national 
identity, is often readily visible in the way it conducts its foreign policy, can be noticed for instance in 
the speech by Lithuania’s president Dalia Grybauskaitė in the United Nations: 
“The world’s attention is now focused on North Korea and other regions, but the same methods 
of blackmail, bullying and aggression are being used by Russia in Ukraine and along NATO’s 
eastern border. As we speak, around one hundred thousand Russian troops are engaged in 
offensive military exercise “Zapad 2017” on the borders with the Baltic States, Poland and even 
in the Arctic. The Kremlin is rehearsing aggressive scenarios against its neighbours, training its 
army to attack the West. The exercise is also part of information warfare aimed at spreading 
uncertainty and fear. Even more disturbingly, the Zapad exercise is just one symptom of the 
Kremlin’s inability to finally end its hatred towards the West.” (Grybauskaitė, General Debate 
of the United Nations General Assembly, 2017) 
 
It is noticeable how Lithuania’s president focuses her concerns almost entirely in Russia, and tries to 
draw the focus of attention from the United Nations to the topic that, due to Lithuania’s recent history, 
and revived by Russia’s attitude and involvement in the latest Ukrainian crisis, is an essential issue of 
concern for Lithuania as a country that finds itself empathetic to the situation of Ukraine due to the 
historical similarities of a country that, like Ukraine, was a former Soviet republic that underwent a 
process of european integration and tried to escape the sphere of influence of the successor of the Soviet 
Union, Russia. This attempt at shifting the United Nations focus of concern towards Russia partly shows 
the direction of Lithuania’s foreign policy in recent years given its own concerns arising to a degree 
from its national identity and exacerbated by currently ongoing events. 
In previous sections of this paper, it has been described how one of the types of relations between 
states is the one in which these states view themselves as enemies. A state who sees another state as an 
enemy, perceives that state, as political scientist Alexander Wendt describes, as “an actor who (1) does 
not recognize the right of the Self to exist as an autonomous being, and therefore (2) will not willingly 
limit its violence toward the Self“ (Wendt, 1999, p. 260). The way Lithuania perceives Russia falls to a 
certain degree to this type of relations, a perception based on Lithuania’s recent historical experiences 
and concerns worsened by actions like the Russian occupation of Crimea. 
Lithuania has experienced a progressive shift in directions in its foreign policy since its 
independence: 
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Table 5. Evolution of Lithuanian foreign policy 
 
Source: Sima Rakutienė, (2013) in Identity and the Construction of Lithuania’s Foreign Policy in the 
Post eu-Period.  
 
As this table describes, while at the early stages after independence the focus of Lithuania’s foreign 
policy was in seeking closer integration with the Western European countries, after this policy proved 
successful by Lithuania’s accession to the European Union in 2004, there was a shift in foreign policy 
aimed at using that previous successes as an opportunity to take a leadership role in the Eastern European 
region where it could use its experience to guide countries with historical backgrounds similar to 
Lithuania’s and that wished for a closer european integration. Another shift can be noticed by the year 
2009, in which Lithuania’s foreign policy became more oriented towards Lithuania’s own interests 
rather than simply building good relations with its neighbours, as Lithuania had already matured its 
position in the international and particularly in the European community, and it found important to focus 
its energies on the issues that matter for its national interests. These shifts reflect to a degree the changes 
that through these periods of time, the Lithuanian society was experimenting: from a process of dramatic 
changes after independence while seeking closer european integration, to the early successes in 
achieving this integration, and to the achievement of greater degrees of integration after the accession to 
the European Union that gave the Lithuanian society a sense of maturity in regards to its European 
integration, allowing the focus of national interests to shift progressively from a conception of European 
integration to a conception based on the defense of those national interests themselves shaping 
international relations, thus changing the foreign policy discourse. 
3.5 Generalization of Lithuanian national identity and its impact on EU-Lithuania relations 
Analysis of theoretical literature revealed that national identity is an ambiguous concept which is widely 
studied and continues to be researched due to the abstractness of this notion. Based on the provided 
theoretical background, national identity is defined as the common sense of belonging to a specific nation 
based on historical experiences, language and culture. Theories such as constructivism and International 
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Relations theory explain the impact of national identity on international relations: national identity 
shapes national interests and according to these interests, the nation shapes its behaviour in international 
relations, precisely in foreign policy. Therefore, analysing the national identity of a specific country it is 
possible to understand what kind of international actor that country is and what is possible to expect 
from it in the future. 
The overview of the theories researching identities has helped to provide the understanding 
necessary to later analyse Lithuanian national identity. Analysis of cultural factors shaping Lithuanian 
national identity allowed to explain the position which Lithuania has taken in the European Union. Lewis 
model has revealed that despite the fact that due to the historical experiences the Lithuanian relationship 
with Poland and Russia are in tension, and despite the fact that Lithuania often identifies itself with its 
Baltic neighbours, it actually is closer to Poland and Russia according to its cultural type. According to 
the Lewis model, Lithuania is placed in between Linear-Active and Multi-Active cultures, leaning more 
towards a Multi-Active type, therefore it has a more unconstrained emotional level than Latvia or 
Estonia, which often might result in impulsive and spontaneous behaviour. This can also be seen as a 
feature of courage in Lithuanian national identity which results in not fearing to resist Russian influence 
and supporting the countries with similar historical experiences despite of the possibility of fuelling 
tensions in relations between Lithuania and Russia. Analysis of Geert Hofstede’s six-dimensional model 
has shown that Lithuania is a country which prefers equality and, being a feminine country, feels 
uncomfortable receiving praise and rather undermines its achievements. What is more, Lithuania is an 
individualist country even though it still has difficulties opening up and rather chooses to remain 
reserved. Hofstede’s analysis also shows that Lithuania has a propensity to worry about the world around 
it, and therefore the Lithuanian society needs rules and laws that makes it feel safe. Finally, analysis of 
this research has confirmed that Lithuanians are cynical, pessimistic and find themselves feeling guilty 
if enjoying the pleasures of life.  
Analysis of these historical experiences also helps to understand Lithuanian position in the 
European Union. Lithuanian national identity is shaped by traumatizing historical experiences, 
specifically by fighting for independence and for the Lithuanian language during the Soviet occupation. 
Historical experiences defined Lithuania’s allies and enemies, resulting in close relationship with Latvia 
and Estonia, support for countries suffering Russian interference, and still viewing Russia as a threat to 
Lithuania’s own existence as an independent country. Lithuanian national identity, shaped by a dramatic 
history, is now resulting in a sometimes possibly exaggerated protection of Lithuanian language 
affecting Lithuanian relationship with Poland and the European Union itself. Analysis of Lithuanian 
values allowed to realise that Lithuania, during the Soviet occupation, was infused with Soviet values 
and attitudes. However, this is present mostly in the older generations, and currently Lithuania is 
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experiencing a transition from traditional values to modern ones, which will eventually allow Lithuania 
to feel a complete member of the European Union. 
Analysis of Eurobarometers of various years has helped to visualise Lithuania as a member of the 
European Union. This analysis has revealed that Lithuanian national identity has gone through 
significant changes and that Lithuania, led by the wish to maintain its independence and national identity, 
acted courageously and right after disengaging from the Soviet Union, joined another, the European 
Union, this time however voluntarily in a sovereign manner and not through occupation. Joining the 
European Union also affected Lithuanian national identity – while Lithuania was one of the most 
pessimistic countries during the Soviet occupation, Lithuania has become the most optimistic member 
towards the European Union. Comparative analysis of values revealed that Lithuania and the rest of the 
European Union prioritize values differently. Due to the historical experiences and specific national 
identity, Lithuania does not emphasize democracy and peace as highly as the European Union but rather 
views security and individual freedom as more important values. Even though Lithuania still lacks strong 
identification with the European Union and defines itself mostly by its own national identity rather than 
by European citizenship, analysis of various publications of Eurobarometer surveys has shown that 
despite the fact that the transition of Lithuania to a completely modern Western country is still ongoing, 
Lithuania is the country which is the most optimistic and supportive of the European Union. 
Investigation of Lithuanian foreign policy allowed to visualise Lithuanian national identity 
manifesting in Lithuanian behavior and actions taken in international relations. Because of the search 
for security, Lithuania joined organizations such as NATO and the European Union. Examination of 
foreign policy discourses enabled to grasp features of Lithuanian national identity such as empathy and 
support for the countries that are under the influence of Russian interference and the courage to openly 
identify Russia as the main threat to Lithuania. 
  
CONCLUSIONS 
The present investigation of the impact of Lithuanian national identity on Lithuanian – EU relations has 
revealed that national identity indeed has a significant role in impacting international relations. The 
following conclusions can be drawn: 
1. Cultural, as well as historical factors play a crucial role in shaping the country as a player of 
international relations. In the case of Lithuania, traumatizing historical experiences, especially during 
the Soviet Occupation, as well as the values infused by the Soviet Union and the values gained while 
fighting for Lithuanian independence and language, were crucial elements that contributed to the 
formation of Lithuanian national identity. 
2. Lithuanian identity results in the overly strong protection of its national identity which followingly 
results in specific actions taken in international relations. The fight for the Lithuanian language during 
the Soviet occupation left deep scars in Lithuanian national identity and the fear to once again feel as if 
Lithuanian national identity is in danger remains, which even resulted in disrespecting Polish minorities 
in Lithuania and undermining European law by Lithuanization of Polish surnames and restricting Polish 
education. These overly protective actions result in tensions of Lithuanian - Polish relations. 
3. Lithuanian priorities in values differ from the European average. Even being a member of the 
European Union, Lithuanian national identity comes to the surface: Lithuania does not emphasize 
democracy and peace as much as the rest of Europe does, it rather views individual freedom and national 
security as the most important values, which makes Lithuania an individualistic country that might be 
seen as the one still not feeling and behaving like a complete member of the European Union. 
4. Even though Lithuania appears not to be as modern member of the European Union as other more 
economically developed and tolerant members of the European Union, Lithuania is currently 
experiencing the transition from values held predominantly by the older generations who lived infused 
by the Soviet regime, to the post-Soviet modern values held by younger generations formed during the 
democratization period after independence. This transition allows to draw predictions of Lithuania 
gradually becoming more European rather than a country whose identity and values still bear the shade 
of historical experiences.  
5. Because of Lithuanian national identity, actions taken in foreign policy and foreign policy discourse 
reveals that Lithuania still views Russia as a potential threat and feels empathy and supports the countries 
that have had the same historical experiences, or in the case of Ukraine, still are under the influence of 
Russia. 
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